



THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE 










State Regulations, Job Search and Wage Bargaining: 
A Study in the Economics of the Informal Sector 
 

















 State Regulations, Job Search and Wage Bargaining:






A p r i l3 ,2 0 0 5
Abstract
This paper analyses the emergence of the informal economy in the environment characterised
by non-competitive labour markets with wage bargaining. We develop a simple extension of the
standard search model à la Pissarides (2000) with formal and informal sectors to show how
a government’s auditing of informal ﬁrms and barriers to ﬁrms’ entry erected in the formal
sector by corrupt bureaucracy can make for stable coexistence of formal and informal jobs in
the long term. In equilibrium, wage diﬀerentials for homogeneous and risk-neutral workers
emerge because diﬀerent types of jobs have diﬀerent lifetimes and/or have diﬀerent creation
costs. The former are explained by the auditing activities of the government that in the simple
set-up destroy informal matches, while keeping formal jobs intact; the latter are due to varying
capital costs, or costs associated with red tape and bureaucratic extortion (bribing). Search
frictions introduce rent sharing between ﬁrms and workers in both formal and informal sectors.
This has an important implication for policy making. In particular, we show that if ceteris
paribus a ﬁrms’ bargaining position vis-à-vis workers is stronger in the formal rather than in
the informal sector, governments can aﬀord to appropriate a larger part of a productive match
surplus (e.g. by levying higher taxes), without endangering the qualitative outcome in the long
run. Rent sharing also implies that both formal and informal sector employees may receive
wages above marginal product. We investigate eﬃciency properties of an equilibrium with
formal and informal jobs and discuss the role of the government in creating and eliminating
such ineﬃciencies partially arising from a version of the hold-up problem (Grout, 1984). Some
lessons are drawn for normative analyses of policies aimed at reduction of informality in set-ups
with non-competitive labour markets. In particular, the conditions are given under which a
reduction in size of the informal sector is likely to be detrimental for economic welfare.
JEL classiﬁcation: E24, E26, H26, J31, J41, J42, J64, O17
Keywords: informal economy, regulations, wage bargaining, labour markets, search models
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
An increase in the size of informal sectors all over the world has recently been the focus of a debate
in many studies. The situation in OECD countries since 1960 has been analysed by Schneider (2000,
2001) and Schneider and Enste (2000) who point to the fact that for all countries investigated the
informal economy has reached a remarkably large size. Other authors note that in most transitional
countries of Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) the irregular sectors have
been growing over the last 15 years too (see, e.g., Johnson et al., 1997; Lackó, 2000; Feige and
Urban, 2003). In such countries as Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine an increase in the share of the
informal sector has been especially notable and its persistent character is clearly observed. As
regards CEE and FSU countries, the primary motivation for this essay, it has been argued that the
increase may well be a transitional feature en route to the market economy, prompted by an increase
in unemployment at the start of economic reforms in the region (Bouev, 2004). At the same time,
long-run strengthening of informality should not be excluded. In the main the literature on the
informal sector is yet to do much work in dotting the i’s and crossing the t’s as regards preconditions
and mechanisms leading to stable coexistence of formal and informal sectors in the longer term.
Generally, it is held that it is the burden of governmental regulations of various nature that
forces ﬁrms and entrepreneurs to move underground. The ratio of reported to unreported activities
d e p e n d sl a r g e l yo nc o s t sa n db e n e ﬁts of operating in each economy (Kaufmann, 1997), which often
are derivatives of governmental actions as can be seen from the discussion in, for example, de Soto
(1989) and Loayza (1996). Schneider and Enste (2000) and Boeri and Garibaldi (2001) point, in
particular, to the constraints on formal ﬁrms in labour markets - the fact that leads to an increase
in size of the underground labour force (see Schneider, 2000, 2001).
According to Castells and Portes (1989), considerations of labour costs are among the most
important factors forcing entrepreneurs to "go shadow" across the globe. Signiﬁcant wage diﬀer-
entials between formal and informal sectors are a notable stylised fact (see Mønsted, 2000, and
Gindling and Terrell, 2004 for evidence from some developing countries, while Kolev, 1998, and
Roshchin and Razumova, 2002, report on the situation in Russia). Part of these diﬀerences is
explained by minimum wage laws and productivity diﬀerentials.1 However, in many FSU countries
minimum wages are not binding, while both formal and informal jobs can often coexist in the
same enterprises, and workers can receive part of their salary in black cash - "under the table", so
that the "productivity gap" explanation is not applicable. Such facts suggest that the interaction
of ﬁrms and employees in the labour market is especially worthy of attention in addressing the
questions of emergence and development of the irregular sector. Nonetheless, as noted in Kolm and
Larsen (2004), the previous theoretical research on informal economies has been mainly conducted
labour market. Finally, I am indebted to N M Rothschild & Sons Ltd., London, for their ﬁnancial support. Other
usual caveats apply.
1Productivity diﬀerentials are traditionally used in modelling of the formal-informal segmentation - for examples
see Agénor and Aizenman (1999), Friedman et al. (2000), or Boeri and Garibaldi (2001).
2within the public ﬁnance tradition. In that literature labour markets are competitive, while wages
are either assumed ﬁxed or determined by market clearing. In such a framework the burden of
regulations cannot cause formal-informal segmentation unless speciﬁc assumptions are made about
preferences or risk attitudes of workers, heterogeneity of the labour force, built-in technological
externalities, etc. Modelling of those aspects has received all the attention of researchers, while
the issue of wage formation is eﬀectively left out. As discussed later on in this work, such ad
hoc assumptions are not always justiﬁed by evidence. However, dropping them would imply that
economic agents just choose the sector where the eﬀect of regulations is least onerous. Thus, in
that literature a non-corner equilibrium with both sectors is eﬀectively presupposed, while the role
of labour costs in the formal-informal split is neglected.
Recently it has become popular to invoke the theory of search in the labour market to model
the formal-informal duality (Kolm and Larsen, 2001, 2004; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2001; Bouev,
2002; Fugazza and Jacques, 2004). The focus of those studies has been mainly the eﬀect of various
governmental policies on the size of the informal sector and the level of involuntary unemployment.
The models suﬀer from a great number of parameters, and are often built around the same speciﬁc
assumptions as are made in earlier studies, which sometimes adds a lot to complication of the work.
At the same time, in our opinion, they camouﬂage a rather simple mechanism that can make for
the emergence of the long-term formal-informal split of the labour market, even when workers are
assumed to be homogeneous, risk-neutral, and there are no presupposed technological externalities.
In this work we look into the interaction of ﬁrms and workers in the non-Walrasian labour
market to see a) if wage bargaining and search can be conducive to the emergence of informal
labour markets in the long term, and b) where the government regulations blamed for being a
main cause of informality ﬁt in with this framework. In such labour markets productive matches of
ﬁrms and workers are costly, they take time to accomplish, while wages are determined in bilateral
negotiations. Following Loayza (1996) we distinguish two types of government regulations that
aﬀect the result of the bargaining and, hence, the equilibria in our model. First, it is the measures
that impact on the costs of functioning in a particular sector. Such policies, as for example,
taxes or social security contributions in the formal economy, and penalties for running business
underground in the informal sector, determine the size of the surplus generated by a productive
match and subject to sharing during wage bargains. In addition, auditing of informal ﬁrms by
the government generates asymmetries in match duration across sectors, which aﬀects the values
of expected or averaged surpluses. Second, it is the activities of the low tier of the government,
such as bureaucracy that, if corrupt, can through red tape, license fees, extortion of bribes, and so
forth, erect artiﬁcial barriers to entry into the formal sector, and thus raise relative costs of access
to legality (see, also, de Soto, 1989; Djankov et al., 2002). In the presence of search frictions these
increase opportunity costs of vacancy posting for ﬁrms looking for workers in the labour market
and weaken ﬁrms’ outside option in wage negotiations. We show that as a consequence, when
3entry costs diﬀer and/or match lifetimes are not the same in the two sectors, wage diﬀerentials
can ensue in long-run equilibrium, thus leading to labour market segmentation. Search and rent
sharing are very important for this result, because without them the system would produce only
corner solutions. However, these features are inherent in labour markets of many countries and have
been conﬁrmed for Eastern Europe, in particular (see Smirnova, 2003, and Roshchin and Markova,
2004, for evidence on time-consuming job search, and Grosfeld and Nivet, 1999, and Shakhnovich
and Yudashkina, 2001, on rent sharing). Thus, it can be concluded that wage bargaining in the
presence of costs of entry can be one of the main channels through which informality is brought
about. Having said that we compare our result with the previous studies of the informal economies,
stressing its independence of preferences of workers, and other assumptions mentioned above. This
work can certainly be extended to incorporate a great deal of those additional features, which would
not, however, diminish the role performed jointly by government regulations and wage bargaining
in the presence of costly search in splitting the labour market.
Having described the workings of and equilibria in our model, we turn to consideration of its
implications for policy making and welfare. The aforementioned studies of informality featuring
the non-competitive labour market with job search and costly matching often attempt a normative
analysis of policies aimed at reduction in the size of the shadow economy (see, e.g., Kolm and
Larsen, 2001; Bouev, 2002; Fugazza and Jacques, 2004). However, they do not take into account
a number of ineﬃciencies arising in the labour market that may well aﬀect the conclusions of such
exercises as regards welfare improving measures. We show that labour market externalities arising
in such environments should not be expected to be internalised. In general, no equilibrium is
eﬃcient in our model. One of the sources of welfare losses in this work is a version of Grout’s
(1984) hold-up problem, whereby workers appropriate part of return on ﬁrms’ start-up investment.
It is shown that while the ﬁrst-best solutions are not likely, a benevolent government can achieve
sub-optimal allocations of resources. However, the upshot of standard policies, such as variation
in the tax rate, eﬃciency of monitoring of the informal ﬁrms, and the penalty rate, depends upon
the state of the labour market. In particular, the relation between the bargaining power of workers
and the elasticity of the matching function prominently ﬁg u r e di nt h eH o s i o se ﬃciency condition
(Hosios, 1990) aﬀects the ultimate eﬀect on economic welfare. This point has been completely
overlooked in the previous research.
The essay is organised as follows. The next section provides a quick overview of the previous
theoretical literature on the informal sector, highlighting a few important soft spots, the main
of which is the absence of a proper account of the labour market, especially wage determination
process. Then Section 3 introduces a two-sector search model à la Pissarides (2000), solves it by
deriving steady state equilibria and discusses how state regulations lead to formal-informal wage
diﬀerentials and, hence, labour market segmentation. Implications for policies and their welfare
impact are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
42 The Informal Sector: A Glimpse of the Literature
There exists an extensive literature concentrating on various aspects of informality. For the most
recent review the reader is referred to Gërxhani (2004), while the eﬀects of regulations on the
emergence and development of the informal sector both from theoretical and empirical perspectives
are discussed in inter alia Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), Loayza (1996), Fortin et al. (1997),
Johnson et al. (1997), Friedman et al. (2000), etc. The large body of previous theoretical research,
however, has suﬀered from a few signiﬁcant deﬁciencies, in our opinion. First, it does not make
clear whether the informal sector can exist in the long run, i.e. whether or not it is just a short-run
product of adjustment in the economy, after some sort of a shock has pulled it out of an equilibrium
state. Second, in many both static and dynamic models an interior equilibrium with both formal
and informal economies is often possible only due to a number of restrictive assumptions about the
utility function of workers, penalties for concealing income, etc. Finally, as regards mechanisms
whereby governmental regulations aﬀect the segmentation of the economy, the literature has mainly
ignored the fact that the decision to ”go underground” is essentially a result of both employers and
employees interacting in the labour market. We brieﬂy discuss these points below.
2.1 Long-run Informality
Empirically the existence of the informal sector provokes no doubt, whereas theoretical substan-
tiation of its existence, especially in the long run, has been not satisfactory. When modelling
informality researchers often restrict their attention to those ad hoc combinations of parameters
alone that generate interior equilibria with an informal sector in their models (see, e.g., Kolm and
Larsen, 2001). Their inattention to corner equilibria (which often are the most probable result),
i.e. equilibria with formal or informal sectors alone, is understandable: on the one hand, an equi-
librium with the formal sector alone does not allow analysis of informality, and, on the other hand,
an equilibrium with the informal sector alone is not conceivable as a realistic long-run outcome.2
At the same time, the reasons for or possibilities of emergence of interior equilibria (let alone their
stability) with both formal and informal sectors are not explained nor explored. However, the
existence of the informal sector can be a transitional phenomenon of adjustment in the economy as
shown, for example, by Bouev (2004) in a theoretical model for countries of Eastern Europe. The
2In general, it is possible to think of a number of reasons why governments may be interested in increasing the
number of oﬃcial ﬁrms. Shleifer and Vishny (1998), for example, suggest that such reasons may emanate from
properly organised ﬁscal systems, politicians’ desire to win greater support for elections, or direct ﬁnancial interests
of politicians (shareholding). On the other hand, while the state itself can have stakes in enterprises, the ﬁrms can
repeatedly interact with public oﬃcials in their own turn. Such interaction may result from historical ability of some
ﬁr m st oi n ﬂuence the government so that they enjoy considerable private gains. Other, de novo ﬁrms can engage in
attempts to capture the state, i.e. make private payments to state oﬃc i a l st oa ﬀe c tt h er u l e so ft h eg a m e ,a sas t r a t e g y
to compete with inﬂuential incumbents. In other words, powerful ﬁrms can collude with state authorities to extract
rents through manipulation of state power (Hellman et al., 2000). Thus, all this suggests that in general conditions
leading to the emergence of corner equilibria with the informal sector alone should be considered as implausible.
5underground sector can be around for some time, even when an economy converges to a long-run
steady state, where informality is not present eventually. Still, it begs the question of whether and
when the informal sector can stably coexist with the formal one in the long term. The conditions
for such coexistence, if any, are of great interest, in our opinion. A recent strand of endogenous
growth literature allowing for the informal sector (e.g., Loayza, 1996; Sarte, 2000) has partially
succeeded in showing that long-run mixed equilibria are indeed possible. Nevertheless, it either
imposes ad hoc restrictions leading to the existence of such outcomes (Loayza, 1996, models the
eﬀective penalty rate for producing informally as an endogenous function of the relative size of the
informal sector), or is still lacking in a proper account of the labour market (Sarte, 2000).
2.2 Restrictive Assumptions
Dependence of the interior equilibrium on speciﬁc assumptions has also characterised other, less
recent, branches of the theoretical literature concerned with informality. For instance, in tax evasion
studies (for recent reviews see, e.g., Andreoni et al., 1998; or Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002), evasion
(and hence, the existence of underground activities) arises in a gamble where a risk-averse tax-
payer trades oﬀ t h eu t i l i t yf r o mt a xs a v i n g sa n dd i s u t i l i t yo fe x t r ar i s kt a k e no no fh a v i n gh e r
income understatement detected by the authorities and penalised. The seminal Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) tax evasion model, for example, predicts that in a situation where individuals are
risk-neutral only corner solutions are possible - an individual would either do no evasion or remit
no tax at all. In the work on unrecorded activity emanating from Allingham and Sandmo (1972)
the equilibrium with coexisting recorded and unrecorded activities is possible only under certain
assumptions about the utility function, i.e., in particular, risk aversion of an individual.
In a similar vein, static models of labour supply to the formal sector and underground economy
are often based on restrictive assumptions about the utility function. This may include imperfect
substitutability of output from the compliant and evading sectors, heterogeneity of workers in
evasion costs (Kesselman, 1989) or skill levels (Sandmo, 1981). Interior equilibria in models with
home production or moonlighting (see, e.g., Becker, 1965; Gronau, 1977) are also a product of
the choice of a speciﬁc utility function, namely preferences over consumption, work in a particular
sector and leisure.
A speciﬁc choice of other functions, such as, for example, a probability of detection, that can
be made an endogenous function of the amount of unrecorded activities (Slemrod and Yitzhaki,
2002), have both characterised interior equilibria in the tax evasion literature mentioned above,
and featured in more recent work on underground economies (see, again, Loayza, 1996). The
main problem with this approach, however, as well as with the one where an interior equilibrium
hinges upon speciﬁc non-economic costs of evasion - moral considerations (Kolm and Larsen, 2001)
or psychic costs (Fugazza and Jacques, 2004), - is that viability and implications of such analyses
depend on the precise way the concepts are formalised (Andreoni et al., 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki,
62002).
All in all, although the contribution of the literature brieﬂy considered here is undisputable,
especially in that it provides a useful framework for an investigation into the eﬀect of various
governmental policies on the relative size and growth of the informal sector, the assumptions made
there do not always stand up to the evidence. For example, as regards diﬀerent preferences over
formal and informal output it can be noted that some goods are produced in both the formal
and informal sectors, or/and individuals may have no clear idea if the supplier is operating in the
formal or the irregular sector (see, e.g., Thomas, 1992, Ch.8). Even when it is claimed that in
countries of, for example, Western Europe the informal sector is concentrated within particular
industries, such as services or construction, so that, on a large scale, diﬀerent goods are produced
in the formal and informal sectors (Kolm and Larsen, 2004), in countries of Eastern Europe, and,
particularly Russia, this assumption may not be correct as the practice of informal contracts is often
widespread (Ingster, 2003). In relation to the dependence of an interior equilibrium with formal and
underground activities on the existence of moral or social considerations it should be stressed that,
although there is little dispute that those factors are important in individual compliance decisions,
but little is agreed upon on how best to incorporate these eﬀects in a theoretical analysis (Andreoni
et al., 1998).
2.3 A Need for Labour Markets
Having said that, another substantial weakness in theory of the informal sector is still its lack of
proper attention to labour markets. Empirical facts such as a drop in participation rates (for a
discussion of situation in Eastern Europe see Boeri, 2000), widespread informal (not registered)
contracts (e.g., Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2002, and Ingster, 2003, mention such practices in
Estonia and Russia, respectively), signiﬁcant formal-informal wage diﬀerentials (for Russian ex-
perience see Kolev, 1998; Roshchin and Razumova, 2002), beg for more research to be done in
the area. Mention by Castells and Portes (1989) of labour costs as one of the key factors causing
informality points to a special interest that should be attracted to revealing the role played by
wages in propagating the eﬀects of governmental regulations and their impact on formal-informal
segmentation. However, as has been noted in the introduction, in the large body of the previous
work on informality wages are either treated as exogenous or assumed to be determined through
market clearing, i.e. no proper theoretical foundation has as yet been established in regard to that
role.
A few recent studies (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2001; Kolm and Larsen, 2001, 2004; Bouev, 2002;
Fugazza and Jacques, 2004) have made an attempt to incorporate the theory of search and matching
functions into the models with the informal sector. The focus of that literature is implications for
policies aimed at the reduction in informality and involuntary unemployment. At the same time,
they provide a hint that wage bargaining in the pres e n c eo fc o s t l ys e a r c hi nt h el a b o u rm a r k e tm a y
7serve as an important channel through which preconditions for formal-informal duality emerge.
In the next section we present a model of the informal sector, which serves to illustrate three
important moments, either not clearly stated or absent completely in the previous studies of the
informal sector. First, it shows that under a broad set of conditions the long-run equilibrium with
both formal and informal sectors is possible. Second, it highlights the role of the wage determination
process in shaping the equilibrium outcome. Finally, all the results are obtained in the absence of
many restrictive assumptions characterising much preceding work.
3 A Model of Informal Employment
The model developed in this section captures the impact of governmental regulations and labour
market institutions, such as wage bargaining, on sectoral reallocation of jobs and workers as well as
wage rates in an economy with formal and informal sectors. It is assumed that the labour market
in such an economy is characterised by risk-neutral ﬁrms and workers searching for each other to
form a match to start production. Search and rent sharing in the process of wage bargains are
crucial to the results we obtain. The approach is similar to that used by Acemoglu (2001) who
studied reallocation of labour across jobs with diﬀerent capital costs. In this work we abstract from
goods and capital markets (both of which are assumed to clear) in order to highlight the joint eﬀect
of state regulations, search frictions, and rent sharing on job composition, rather than on prices of
both capital input and ﬁnal output.3
3.1 The Main Idea
The informal sector is seen as representing productive (not rent-seeking4) activities that are not
associated with crime or household production.5,6 Thus, we take the approach that views informal
employment as resulting from eﬀorts of entrepreneurs to trade oﬀ costs and beneﬁts of functioning
in compliance with formal regulations.
It is assumed that goods produced both in formal and informal sectors are perfect substitutes,
3See Kolm and Larsen (2004) for a general equilibrium model with wage bargaining and costly search where prices
absorb part of the eﬀect of governmental policies.
4Acemoglu (1995) and Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) study the allocation of talent between productive and rent-
seeking activities. Vostroknutova (2003) extends their models to include an underground sector.
5In the literature on informal activities it is normal to distinguish between household activities, informal sector,
irregular sector and criminal sector (see, for example, Thomas, 1992). While the idea behind home production and
criminal activities should be obvious, one might become confused over the diﬀerence between informal and irregular
sectors. Usually it is small workshops and self-employment which are regarded as the informal sector. It can also
comprise home production that is traded in the market. All these activities are not illegal. The sector that we
consider in this model is indeed irregular, which comprises production of legal output, but involves tax evasion and
avoidance of formal regulations. However, we will use both terms ”irregular” and ”informal” interchangeably. Other
synonyms used are the "shadow" or "underground" economy.
6On models of crime see inter alia Becker (1968), and Fiorentini and Peltzman, eds. (1995); on household
production see Becker (1965), and Gronau (1977).
8while marginal productivity of formal and informal matches is the same. We do not go along the
lines of the prevalent view of the informal economy (see, for example, Agénor and Aizenman, 1999;
Boeri and Garibaldi, 2001) that assumes underground jobs to be less productive and, hence, paying
lower wages. We shall see that what is important for the conclusions we draw is not the diﬀerentials
in productivity but the diﬀerences in surpluses that formal and informal matches generate.
Both formal and informal ﬁrms have to sink some costs before opening a vacancy, meeting
a worker and starting production. Those can be capital costs, vacancy advertisement costs, or
bribes and other extortionary payments that ﬁrms have to bear before starting their businesses.
We assume that these costs are greater in the formal sector than in the informal one, which can
be explained by higher entrance barriers into the formal sector or access costs to legality (Loayza,
1996) associated with bribery, license fees and registration requirements (de Soto, 1989; Djankov
et al., 2002). In the appendix we muse on departures from this set-up. Another main conceptual
diﬀerence between the two sectors is in the relation to oﬃcial regulations and costs associated with
them. To ﬁrms producing formally, and hence, abiding by the rules and regulations imposed by
the state, they imply additional costs of production such as, for example, taxes, social security
contributions, etc. (in what follows we refer to all such costs as "taxes" to keep things simple). On
the other hand, functioning informally does not involve those expenses. Jobs can be undeclared in
order to avoid costs of functioning openly. Although such concealment of production is possible it
is prosecuted by oﬃcials. Thus, each hiding ﬁrm faces some positive probability of being caught,
ﬁned, and closed as a result of government monitoring or audit. This, in turn, implies that informal
matches on average last for a shorter time.
Workers in the model can either work formally or informally or be unemployed. We neglect
possibilities of moonlighting, so workers can perform only one activity at a time. Aggregate labour
supply is inelastic.
Once having met, workers and ﬁrms bargain over wages and, as a result, employees can ap-
propriate some rents. Given diﬀerent entrance and production costs and varying average match
duration across sectors, rent sharing leads to equilibrium wage diﬀerentials. In turn, diﬀerent labour
costs and diﬀerent production surpluses in the two sectors provide an opportunity for the formal
and informal sectors to coexist in the long run. The equilibrium allocation of jobs and workers
in steady state is eventually determined by zero proﬁt conditions as free entry in each sector is
assumed.
3.2 Matching Technology
In the absence of on-the-job search it is only the unemployed workers who look for jobs. We assume
that search is random or undirected, i.e. workers search for any employment and accept the ﬁrst
job that oﬀers them prospects at least as good as their currently expected life-time income. In
the presence of undirected search both formal and informal vacancies have the same probability of
9meeting workers. Then it is the total number of vacancies that enters the matching function.
The number of job matches is given by M(n,v),w h e r en is the number of workers seeking jobs
(i.e. the number of the unemployed) and v is the number of vacancies created in the economy.
With constant returns to matching, the instantaneous probability that a vacant job meets a
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n.
The ﬁrst derivative of the ﬂow rate of matching for a vacancy, q0 (θ), is negative, because
the greater is the value of θ t h em o r ed i ﬃcult for ﬁr m si tb e c o m e st oﬁll the job. In the matching
literature θ is referred to as market tightness from the ﬁrms’ standpoint (see, for example, Pissarides,
2000).










where α0 (θ) > 0.
When q(θ) < ∞ and α(θ) < ∞ then matching is not instantaneous and takes some time.










3.3 Formal and Informal Jobs
Jobs are created in either the formal or the informal sector. We do not necessarily deﬁne one job
as one ﬁrm by assuming constant returns in production. Before opening a vacancy a risk-neutral
ﬁrm has to decide in which sector the potential match will produce and, at this point, will have
to bear some costs. These costs are either kf or ki,i ft h eﬁrm is to open a vacancy in the formal
economy or underground, respectively. These start-up costs are incurred before the ﬁrm meets
its employees and can be thought of as capital expenditure, job advertisement costs as well as a
registration fee or bribes to be paid, for example, to prevent a delay in registration in the formal
sector or to guarantee security of the job in the informal sector.7 The important assumption we
make is that access to legality is more costly than access to informal production, i.e. kf >k i. In
other words, we postulate that the presence of extortion costs at the moment of entry in the formal
sector implies higher instant start-up costs to entrepreneurs (see de Soto, 1989, and Loayza, 1996,
for justiﬁcation of this assumption). The latter are generally thought of as being wealthy enough
to meet the start-up costs without resorting to external credit.
7Gërxhani (2004) points out that, although the ease of entry is used by various researchers as one of the criterion
for deﬁning the informal sector, entry costs into informality do exist.
10All matches in the economy, either formal or informal, die at rate δ,i nw h i c hc a s et h ej o bi s
destroyed while the worker becomes unemployed.8
Both formal and informal jobs are equally productive. Wages are paid out of the match product,
y. In addition to wages, formal jobs have to pay a lump sum tax, τ, whereas informal jobs enjoy
tax evasion.
In the model it is implicitly assumed that there are some taxation authorities, e.g. the tax
police, whose aim is to collect taxes and reveal cases of tax evasion. So, there is an exogenous ﬂow
probability m that an employer gets caught in engaging in underground business and ﬁned by the
amount F.W h e n m strikes the informal match is liquidated and the burden of the ﬁne is borne
by the employer, not the employee. An alternative to match liquidation may be its continuation or
transformation into a formal match. However, if detected parties fear that continuing the match
either formally or informally would result in more frequent visits by the tax police, our assumption
of match destruction is reasonable9,10 (see, e.g., Kolm and Larsen, 2004).
The Bellman equation11 for a formal job is
rJf = y − wf − τ + δ (0 − Jf), (1)
where r is the ﬂow rate of return on having the job ﬁlled (the interest or discount rate), Jf is the
value of the ﬁlled formal job to the employer, and wf is the formal wage. The equation reads that
the return to the ﬁrm on a ﬁlled job in the formal sector is equal to the diﬀerence between worker’s
productivity and costs, plus a potential change in value in the case of the match break-up. At this
stage we shall assume very generally that the productivity of a match, y, is high enough to cover
wages and taxes, while more exact restrictions on parameters of the model are given in Section
3.6.2.
By analogy, for an informal job we have
8Alternatively, one can consider a situation when δ (or m - see below) strikes, the match is destoyed but the job
is not. That is, the job turns into a vacancy, rather than is liquidated. However, such alteration does not change the
qualitative results of the analysis.
9Here we also exclude the possibility that ﬁrms can avoid penalties and liquidation by paying a bribe to the tax
inspector. However, in reality the agents directly carrying out monitoring may often side-contract with ﬁrms, thus
allowing the latter to evade payment of ﬁnes (see, e.g., Chander and Wilde, 1992, and Wane, 2000, for models of
collusion between tax inspectors and tax evaders).
10Safavian et al. (2001) note that visits of ﬁrms by the tax police are closely linked to corruption - regulatory
inspections are positively correlated with amount of bribes paid. Interestingly, tax authorities can often change
regulation without notifying entrepreneurs and then pay them a visit to obtain a ﬁne or extorting a bribe for
avoidance of restrictions implied by the regulation. Evidence suggests, however, that, e.g. in Russia, ﬁrms with
higher reservation proﬁts (i.e., revenues allowing them to function just without making losses) are less likely to be
charged excessive bribe payments and, hence, less likely t ob ec h e c k e db ym o n i t o r i n gb o d i e s .A b o v ew eh a v ea s s u m e d
that kf is higher than ki, which in turn implies higher reservation revenues in the formal sector. Thus, in our model
the absence of monitoring and ﬁnes in the formal sector can be justiﬁed not only by the nature of oﬃcial functioning:
it can also be interpreted in the light of the results obtained by Safavian et al.
11Hereafter we consider only steady state values of the Bellman equations since the focus of the paper is the
irregular sector in the long run. Out of steady states each Bellman equation should be augmented to include a ﬁrst
time derivative of an appropriate value function.
11rJi = y − wi − mF +( δ + m)(0− Ji), (2)
where Ji is the value of the ﬁlled informal job and wi is the informal wage. The equation implies
that the return on a ﬁlled job in the informal sector is equal to the diﬀerence between the product
of the match and the worker’s wage, less an expected ﬁne in the case of being caught by tax
authorities, plus a change in value due to the match cessation.
It is assumed that vacancy maintenance in either formal or irregular sector involves no ﬂow
costs.12 Then the Bellman equations for vacancies in formal and informal sectors are:
rVf = q(θ)(Jf − Vf), (3)
rVi = q(θ)(Ji − Vi), (4)
where q(θ) is the ﬂow rate of ﬁlling a vacancy as deﬁned above.
3.4 Workers
There is a ﬁxed (normalised to 1, for convenience) mass of identical workers in the economy. They
are risk-neutral, have the same discount rate r as ﬁrms, and derive utility solely from the wage.
Workers can be either employed in one of the sectors or unemployed.
Formal employment provides workers with wage wf, so that the value of working formally
satisﬁes the Bellman equation
rEf = wf + δ(Eu − Ef).13 (5)
It reads that the return on formal employment is equal to the wage income plus a change in
unemployment in case of the match break-up.
As informal employment brings in wage wi, by analogy we have
rEi = wi +( δ + m)(Eu − Ei). (6)
That is, the return on informal employment is equal to the wage income plus a potential change into
unemployment as a result of either the match cessation or job closure due to tax evasion detected
by the authorities.
Finally, the Bellman equation for the unemployed is
12It can readily be shown that the presence of maintenance costs does not change the model qualitatively.
13In order to keep things simple, we neglect the impact of income taxes on the value of being employed in the
formal sector. At the same time there is evidence (e.g., Lemieux et al., 1994) on unimportance of taxes for sector
choice.
12rEu = bu + α(θ)(φ(Ef − Eu)+( 1− φ)(Ei − Eu)), (7)
where bu is the unemployment beneﬁt, φ is the probability of meeting a formal vacancy, 0 <φ<1,
and α(θ) is the ﬂow rate of ﬁnding a job in either sector. The equation says that the return on
being unemployed equals unemployment compensation plus a potential change into employment in
one of the sectors.
3.5 Wage Determination
Wages in the model are determined through a wage bargaining process with the bargaining power
of workers, β, given exogenously and such that 0 <β<1. Then the Nash (1950) bargaining
solution implies:
(1 − β)(Ef − Eu)=β (Jf − Vf), (8)
(1 − β)(Ei − Eu)=β (Ji − Vi). (9)
The Nash solution in this case assumes that the threat (reservation) points of employers and
employees are represented by the value of unﬁlled vacancy in an appropriate sector and the value
of unemployment, respectively. This implies that bargaining is actually ex post, i.e. it takes place
before the consummation of a match, but after a producer has opened a vacancy. Thus, ﬁrms
are assumed to commit to wages over which the consensus was reached: they cannot change the
contract once a worker gets employed.
3.6 Steady State Equilibria
It is assumed that entry in our economy is free, so that ﬁrms’ proﬁts have to equal zero in equi-
librium. This implies that it should not be possible for an additional vacancy in both formal and
informal sectors to open and make expected net proﬁts. Hence,
Vf = kf, (10)
Vi = ki. (11)
That is, the condition of zero proﬁts implies that start-up costs equal to kf and ki in formal and
informal sectors, respectively, must be just recouped in equilibrium.
A steady state equilibrium in the model is characterised by the labour market tightness, θ,a
proportion of formal vacancies, φ, and by value functions Jf, Ji, Vf, Vi, Ef, Ei,a n dEu,s u c h
13that equations (1)-(11) are all simultaneously satisﬁed. As we have assumed undirected search, in
steady state both formal and informal vacancies meet workers at the same rate and both types of
job are accepted if they oﬀer a reward at least as large as a worker’s outside option.
In order to see what equilibrium allocations of jobs and workers are possible in our economy we
shall proceed through the analysis by re-expressing equations (10) and (11) as functions of θ and
φ, and then studying their behaviour in the (θ,φ)-plane.
3.6.1 Zero proﬁt conditions
Solving (1) and (2) for Jf and Ji we arrive at
Jf =




y − wi − mF
ρ
, (13)
where π = r + δ and ρ = r + δ + m are the eﬀective discount rates in formal and informal sectors,
respectively. These account both for the interest rate r (equal to the workers’ and ﬁrms’ rate of
time preference under risk neutrality) and "depreciation", δ or δ + m, which diﬀers across the two
sectors.
Substituting these solutions together with conditions (10) and (11) for (8) and (9), and com-
bining the results with equations (5) and (6), simple algebra gives
wf = β (Sf + bu)+( 1− β)rEu, (14)
wi = β (Si + bu)+( 1− β)rEu. (15)
For readability of formulae in (14) and (15), and in the rest of the paper by Sf = y −τ −πkf −bu
and Si = y − mF − ρki − bu we denote the total ﬂow surpluses of a match net of unemployment
beneﬁts in the formal and informal economies, respectively. These equations imply that the worker
gets share β of the surplus of a match plus (1 − β) times her outside option.
Having obtained the expressions for wf and wi, by using equations (12) and (13) together with
(3) and (4), we can deﬁne two functions Πf (θ,φ) and Πi (θ,φ) that represent proﬁts made in the
formal and the informal sectors, respectively:


























From (7) it also follows that Eu = Eu (θ,φ), i.e. the value of being unemployed is also a function
of the market tightness, θ, and the proportion of formal vacancies, φ.
Complicated as they are at ﬁrst sight, the expressions (16) and (17) above allow, in fact, an




(r+q(θ))ρ give the expected rents
that formal and informal matches will generate when a ﬁrm and a worker meet. These rents are
shared between the two parties in a bilateral monopoly bargaining game (see, e.g., Shaked and
Sutton, 1984), so that in the end the ﬁrm gets share (1 − β) of the rent according to its bargaining
power. Consider for example formal proﬁt (16). After consummation the match generates product
y. Out of this product the ﬁrm has to: a) pay oﬀ taxes, τ; b) cover start-up costs (taking account of
"depreciation"), πkf; c) cover opportunity costs of having kf units of resources invested in creation
of this particular vacancy,
rπkf
q(θ) (i.e. the vacancy that on average costs πkf, will be idle until it meets
a worker after an average time of search, 1
q(θ), elapses - all this can be invested elsewhere at rate
r); d) pay a premium to a hired worker for saving of opportunity costs that the representative ﬁrm
enjoys when a job is formed,
βrπkf
(1−β)q(θ) (for a similar intuition see, e.g., Pissarides, 2000, p.17); and,
ﬁnally, e) the ﬁrm has to compensate the worker for her outside option rEu. The remaining surplus
is split between the ﬁrm and the worker according to their bargaining powers given by (1 − β) and
β, respectively. In particular, in the case of θ → 0, i.e. q(θ) →∞(so that ﬁrms have no problem
ﬁnding a match, which is eﬀectively a Walrasian labour market from the ﬁrms’ standpoint) and when
ﬁrms expect to make positive proﬁts the expression above is reduced to (1 − β) (y−τ−πkf−rEu(0,φ))
π .
That is, ﬁrm’s (averaged) proﬁts are given by share (1 − β) of the expected surplus, while workers
capture share β of the expected surplus in addition to being paid their outside option rEu (0,φ). In
contrast to the case when θ>0, now workers are not compensated for saving of opportunity costs
as matching is instant for ﬁrms. If however, θ →∞ , i.e. q(θ) → 0 (so that workers ﬁnd a match
instantly, while ﬁrms on average wait inﬁnitely long), by using the properties of function Eu (θ,φ)
that are studied below, it is possible to show that formal proﬁts are reduced to −kf. In this case all
the match rents are appropriated by workers in the process of bargaining, while ﬁrms gain nothing
and should not expect to recover even their start-up costs kf. The expression for informal proﬁt
(17) can be analysed by analogy.
From (16) and (17) the zero proﬁt conditions (10) and (11) can be re-expressed as Πf (θ,φ)=0
and Πi (θ,φ)=0 , or, as in general
(1−β)q(θ)
(r+q(θ))π > 0 and
(1−β)q(θ)
(r+q(θ))ρ > 0,






− rEu (θ,φ)=0 , (18)






− rEu (θ,φ)=0 . (19)
15Each of the equations (18) and (19) deﬁnes θ as a function of φ and parameters of the model
kf,k i,β ,r ,δ ,b u,τ ,m ,and F.
To close the circle we now need to analyse properties of Eu (θ,φ).
3.6.2 The value of being unemployed
The value of being unemployed follows from (7) and equals
Eu(θ,φ)=
buπρ+ α(θ)β (φρ(Sf + bu)+( 1− φ)π(Si + bu))
r(α(θ)β ((1 − φ)π + φρ)+πρ)
. (20)
For the function Eu(θ,φ) it can easily be veriﬁed that it is continuous and bounded by bu
r from
below and by 1
r (max(Sf,S i)+bu) from above. Also, it is strictly increasing in θ provided that y
is big enough.14 The intuition behind this result is straightforward: the value of being unemployed
is increasing in market tightness, as it becomes easier to ﬁnd a job. In contrast, without additional
assumptions about the parameters of the model Eu(θ,φ) cannot be shown to be increasing or
decreasing in φ everywhere. The sign of the derivative
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ hinges upon the relative value of
employment in formal and informal sectors, Ef and Ei, respectively. In particular, whenever Ef is
greater than Ei,
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ is positive, and negative otherwise. This result implies that the value of
being unemployed rises whenever does the proportion of vacancies posted in the sector where the
value of employment is higher.
The relative value of Ef and Ei depends on various combinations of the model’s parameters and
may also depend on the level of market tightness. A formal analysis in Appendix A shows that the
variety of parameter combinations is eﬀectively reduced to, on the one hand, the relation between
the values of sector ﬂow surpluses,15 Sf and Si, and, on the other hand, the relation between
their discounted or expected values,
Sf
π and Si







-plane. Fig.1 illustrates the cases,16 while here we provide their intuitive
explanation.
Region 1 is restricted by the horizontal line
Sf
Si =1from below and vertical lines π
ρ =0and
π
ρ =1from the left and the right sides, respectively. In this region the total surplus of a formal
match, Sf, is greater than the total informal surplus, Si, while the expected value of the former,
14In particular, to guarantee
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂θ > 0 we must reasonably claim that at least y>τ+kπ+bu, or, equivalently,
Sf > 0, i.e. the product of a match, y, is at least as large as to pay all the ﬂow costs of functioning in the formal
sector and the wage equal to the reservation value, bu. This condition implies also that Ef >E u holds. Analogously,
to insure Ei >E u, we must guarantee y>m F+ kρ + bu or Si > 0. Otherwise, whenever any of these conditions is
not met, an appropriate sector simply does not exist.
15Although for convenience we refer to Sf and Si as surpluses, in fact they are the sector surpluses net of unem-
ployment beneﬁts as has been mentioned when the notation was introduced. It is these values on top of bu that ﬁrms
and workers worry about when compare attractiveness of either sector. This is explained by that fact that a match in
either sector has to pay workers at least unemployment compensation so that they do not prefer to stay unemployed.























Figure 1: Dependence of employment values on model’s parameters
Sf
π , is greater than the expected value of the latter, Si
ρ . This is enough to guarantee that Ef >E i.
To see why this is so, let us compare two extreme situations.
First, consider a worker having two oﬀers from formal and informal ﬁrms and knowing that
whatever oﬀer she accepts she will never lose a job thereafter. For such a worker formal employment
brings in a higher value than informal employment if and only if Sf >S i (from the Nash bargaining
solution it follows that her wage in either sector is a constant fraction of the match surplus in the
sector). This situation can also be viewed as corresponding to the case when market tightness is
inﬁnite, so that oﬀers from both sectors arrive immediately. As a second extreme, let us pick a
w o r k e rw h oh a st w oo ﬀers from the two sectors, but knows that both matches dissolve soon, and
after that she will stay unemployed forever. For such a worker the value of formal employment is




This case can also be seen as reﬂecting a situation when market tightness is equal to nil, so that
these two oﬀers are the last chance for the employee. In such a world, the discounting is used to
take account of diﬀerent match duration across the two sectors captured by the rates π and ρ.I t
should be intuitively clear that all other possible cases lie in between these two the "best" and the
"worst" scenarios.
Thus, if both Sf >S i and
Sf
π > Si
ρ ( a si nr e g i o n1 ,F i g . 1 )t h e nf o rb o t ht h e" b e s t "a n dt h e




By analogy, whenever Sf <S i and
Sf
π < Si
ρ (as in region 3, which is bordered by the 45-degree
line, and the lines
Sf
Si =0and π
ρ =1in Fig.1), then Ef <E i as a worker in both the "best" and
17the "worst" situation prefers informal employment. Hence,
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ < 0 in this case.
Finally, when Sf <S i but
Sf
π > Si
ρ (region 2, which lies in between regions 1 and 3 in Fig.1)
the worker has diﬀerent preferences depending on circumstances. In particular, there must exist a
threshold level of the market tightness that separates the eﬀects of the two scenarios on the total
value of formal and informal employment. Speciﬁcally, it can be shown that as θ → 0 (no oﬀers




dominates. However, as θ →∞(instant re-employment) Ef <E i as the eﬀect of the "best"
scenario Sf <S i dominates the other one. The proposition below extends the result on the sign of
the derivative
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ (its proof is relegated to the appendix).
Proposition 1 There exists some threshold value of the market tightness θ, deﬁned by parameters
kf,k i,β ,r ,δ ,b u,τ,m ,F ,and parameters of the matching function, such that for parameter values
satisfying conditions in region 2, Fig.1, and for any θ>θ the derivative
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ is negative, and
for any θ<θ it is positive.17
Having established the properties of function Eu(θ,φ) we command all the knowledge necessary
to derive and study equilibria in our model.
3.6.3 Finding equilibria
If there exists an equilibrium with both formal and informal jobs then both formal and informal
proﬁts must be equal to zero at the equilibrium point. That is, the equations (18) and (19) are
simultaneously satisﬁed. Alternatively, there can exist equilibria with only one type of job. In that
case, proﬁts in one of the sectors would be negative and only one of the equations (18) and (19)
would hold.
Two loci The two zero proﬁt conditions (18) and (19) deﬁn et w ol o c io ff o r m a la n di n f o r m a lj o b s
in the (θ,φ)-plane. Both must be evaluated with the expression for Eu(θ,φ) (20) substituted in.
By using simple algebra and invoking the implicit function theorem it can easily be veriﬁed that















∂θ is always positive, whereas
∂q(θ)
∂θ < 0, it is obvious that the denominator is negative.
Then the slope of the locus of formal jobs has a sign opposite to the sign of
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ .
Analogously, the slope of the locus of informal jobs (19) in the (θ,φ)-plane is
17In fact this value of the market tightness, θ, is a bifurcation point that separates two regions with diﬀerent













which, again, by the same token, has a sign opposite to the sign of
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ .
Remark 1 Both the locus of formal jobs (18) and the locus of informal jobs (19) have slopes of
the same sign.
For diﬀerent combinations of parameters represented by regions 1-3 in Fig.1, the two loci will be
either positively or negatively sloped. However, the fact that they always have slopes of the same
sign implies that only four qualitatively diﬀerent situations are possible. They are represented in
Fig.2-5, assuming that both loci have negative slopes.
Fig.2 and 3 show two corner equilibria with formal jobs alone, (θ∗,1), and with informal jobs
alone, (θ∗,0), respectively. In the ﬁrst case, the locus of formal jobs lies above the locus of informal
jobs for all possible values of φ. As higher values of the market tightness, θ, imply lower proﬁts
for ﬁrms in both formal and informal sectors, the relative position of the two loci indicates that
formal ﬁrms are more proﬁtable and can cope with more competition from other ﬁrms, than can
do their informal counterparts. In other words, formal ﬁrms break even at higher values of the
market tightness so they can aﬀord higher costs of functioning. Thus, they can still make positive
proﬁts while informal ﬁr m sa l r e a d ym a k el o s s e s .T h ec a s ew i t hpurely informal equilibrium is just
a mirror image of the situation just described.
Fig.4 and 5 present two more interesting cases where mixed or interior equilibria with both
formal and informal jobs are possible. In those cases the two loci (18) and (19) intersect at some
θ∗ and 0 <φ ∗ < 1. Depending on the relative position of the two loci an interior equilibrium can
be accompanied by corner equilibria of the types we discussed in the previous paragraph. At the
same time, the mixed equilibrium itself can either be stable or unstable, so that in the long run the
economy either have chances to end up in a situation with both types of job or is likely to settle in
a corner equilibrium with one type of job only. It should be noted that by stability we mean here
the ability of the economy to return to the same equilibrium allocation of vacancies if some sort of
a shock pulls it out of the equilibrium position. For example, if in the equilibrium shown in Fig.4
some random perturbation leads to an increase in the proportion of formal vacancies above φ∗,t h e
two zero proﬁt conditions imply that ceteris paribus ﬁrms opening or holding an informal vacancy
are better oﬀ than ﬁrms opening or holding a formal vacancy. This will attract more ﬁrms in the
informal sector so that eventually the proportion of formal vacancies will return to the equilibrium
value φ∗. Thus, the interior equilibrium depicted in Fig.4 is stable, while the interior equilibrium
in Fig.5 is unstable. The corner equilibria in Fig.5 are stable.
Both Fig.4 and 5 illustrate the case where there is only one interior equilibrium. However, as








































Figure 5: Multiple equilibria
21would correspond to diﬀerent interior equilibria. Nevertheless, in the case of our model it can readily
be veriﬁed that the interior equilibrium is always unique, whenever it exists. The conditions for
existence of equilibria of diﬀerent types shown in Fig.2-5 are given in the next subsection. It also
provides an intuition underlying our results.
Conditions for existence and stability of equilibria Any equilibrium in our model results
from interaction of unemployed workers and ﬁrms in the labour market when they bargain over the
rents to be generated by the match.
When one of the sides completely dominates the market its preferences unambiguously de-
ﬁne which sector of employment exists in equilibrium. For example, when the market tightness
is zero, a ﬁrm has no problem ﬁnding a match and enters the sector that provides the highest
averaged return on start-up expenditures. Recalling the discussion of proﬁt functions in Section
3.6.1, in such a situation the ﬁrm should expect to receive a share (1 − β)
Sf
π of rents in the formal
s e c t o ro ras h a r e(1 − β) Si
ρ of informal rents. Thus the returns on start-up costs kf and ki are
given by (1 − β)
Sf
πkf and (1 − β) Si
ρki in formal and informal sectors, respectively. If, for instance,
(1 − β)
Sf





ρki , the ﬁrm prefers the formal sector.
To the contrary, in a situation when the market tightness is inﬁnite, it is the workers who
instantly receive oﬀers from both formal and informal ﬁrms. From expressions (14) and (15) and
the properties of function Eu (θ,φ) it follows that workers receive wages wf = Sf and wi = Si in
formal and informal sectors, respectively. Thus in competing for workers ﬁrms cannot do any better
than oﬀer the whole surpluses of the match in any sector. Obviously, in such a situation workers
will turn down oﬀers of a lower wage, i.e. if, for example, Sf >S i, workers will never accept oﬀers
from the informal sector.18
In the process of bargaining the balance of power shifts either to one or the other side depending
on the level of market tightness. Thus, it should be intuitively clear that if in the two extreme cases
just considered both ﬁrms and workers prefer the same sector, then in equilibrium with matching
frictions on both sides only jobs in that sector are created. Then the equilibrium market tightness
is stabilised at such a level that proﬁts of ﬁrms are equal to zero. If, however, given full control
of the market, preferences of ﬁrms and workers do not coincide, an equilibrium with both types of
job can result.
As preferences of both ﬁrms and workers over the sector choice when they do not face matching
problems are determined by the relative values of sector surpluses Sf and Si, and respective returns
Sf
πkf and Si







possible cases are illustrated in Fig.6 that shows four non-overlapping regions 1-4, each of which
corresponds to various combinations of parameters and represents a particular equilibrium type.
To bear a resemblance to Fig.1 we measure the ratio of formal and informal surpluses,
Sf
Si ,o nt h e
18Also, condition Sf >S i implies that the value of formal employment is greater than the value of informal




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Existence conditions for model’s equilibria
vertical axis, and the ratio of the eﬀective discount rates π
ρ on the horizontal axis. The borders of
the regions are deﬁned by the two axes, the straight line with a slope
kf
ki and running through the




Region 1 In region 1 in Fig.6 Sf >S i and
Sf
πkf > Si
ρki, i.e. both sides of the market prefer
formal employment when they have full control over dividing the match surplus. Then in such a
situation only an equilibrium with formal jobs can satisfy both parties.
In this region the derivative
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ > 0, so that expressions (21) and (22) are negative, and
both loci (18) and (19) are downward sloping in the (θ,φ)-plane. The intuition for that is as follows.
The value of being non-employed rises as the proportion of formal vacancies, φ,i n c r e a s e s .A sw i t h
t h er i s ei nφ the reservation option of workers, rEu(θ,φ), becomes larger in value, ﬁrms have to
pay higher wages. This can be seen from the two expressions for wages (14) and (15). A rise in
wages squeezes ﬁrms’ proﬁt margins so that ﬁrms break even at lower levels of market tightness,
i.e. the duration of vacancy idleness, 1
q(θ), that can be tolerated by ﬁrms before a productive match
is formed, is shorter. Thus in the (θ,φ)-plane for both loci (18) and (19) higher values of φ must
correspond to lower values of θ.
As seen from (21) and (22) depending on the relation between πkf and ρki the formal job locus
can be either ﬂatter or steeper than the informal one. In any case, as
∂Πf(θ,φ)
∂θ |Πf(θ,φ)=0 < 0 and
∂Πi(θ,φ)
∂θ |Πi(θ,φ)=0 < 0 (see Appendix A for proof), the formal locus must lie above the informal one.
The resulting equilibrium without informal jobs is stable, and the market tightness is such that
19It runs above the 45-degree line as kf >k i by assumption.
23proﬁts in the formal sector are nil, while proﬁts in the informal sector are negative (Fig.2).
Region 2 In region 2 in Fig.6 restrictions on parameters suggest that the formal surplus
is smaller than the informal surplus, Sf <S i, while the ratio of returns on entry costs implies
Sf
πkf > Si
ρki. This means that, on the one hand, the formal sector is more appealing to employers
when they dominate the market, but, on the other hand, workers would prefer being employed
informally if they had no problem landing a job. Thus, there must exist a value of the market
tightness, θ∗, and the proportion of formal vacancies, φ∗ ∈ (0,1), such that ﬁrms are indiﬀerent as
to the sector where to place a vacancy. It is easy to verify, that indeed in this case the locus of
formal jobs (18) and the locus of informal jobs (19) have an intersection point for some 0 <φ ∗ < 1,




that the ﬂow value of formal start-up costs, πkf, must be smaller then the ﬂow value of informal
start-up costs, ρki, in this region, i.e. the formal jobs locus is steeper than its informal counterpart
in some neighbourhood of an interior equilibrium (θ∗,φ ∗). As regards the sign of the slopes of
the two loci, by comparing Fig.1 and Fig.6 it can be seen that in region 2 the partial derivative
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ can be either negative or positive, so from (21) and (22) the loci can be either positively
or negatively sloped. From Proposition 1 we know that the sign of the derivative is negative for
any θ>θ, and positive for any θ<θ,w h e r eθ is some threshold value of the market tightness.
Then for θ>θ the two loci will both be positively sloped, whereas for θ<θ they will be downward
sloping. The outcome bears on the stability of the interior equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Let θ be a threshold value of market tightness such that
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ =0 , and let (θ∗,φ ∗)
be a point of an interior equilibrium in region 2, Fig.6. Then given kf >k i and ρ>π ,θ ∗ is always
less than θ.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Proposition 2 implies that if the two loci of formal and informal jobs intersect and an interior
equilibrium results we can conﬁne ourselves to the situation with a less tight labour market, i.e.
θ<θ. Then
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ > 0, the two loci have negative slopes and the formal jobs locus crosses the
informal jobs locus from above: the resulting equilibrium is unique and stable (Fig.4).
Region 3 The situation in this region mirrors the one in region 1: both the formal surplus
is less than the informal surplus, Sf <S i, and the return on start-up costs in the formal sector is
less than the return on entry into the informal sector,
Sf
πkf < Si
ρki. Thus, both sides of the labour
market favour the informal sector, so that the equilibrium with informal jobs only results. In this
region
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ can potentially be either negative or positive, while πkf can be either greater or
less than ρki, so that the relative steepness of the loci and the sign of their slopes are ambiguous
in general. However, whatever case comes about the informal locus lies above the formal one, and
24the outcome is stable to changes in parameters (Fig.3). The equilibrium market tightness drives
informal proﬁts to zero, while formal proﬁts are negative.
Region 4 Finally, in region 4,
Sf
πkf < Si
ρki, while Sf >S i. So, the employers prefer the informal
sector when face no problem meeting workers, while the workers are unambiguously after formal
jobs when market tightness is inﬁnite. By analogy with the case of region 2, the locus of formal jobs
(18) and the locus of informal jobs (19) intersect at some φ∗ ∈ (0,1), i.e. there exists an interior
equilibrium. The restrictions on para m e t e r si nr e g i o n4c a nh o l do n l yi fπkf >ρ k i, i.e. the formal
locus is ﬂatter than the informal locus in the vicinity of (θ∗,φ ∗). As
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ > 0, the two loci
are negatively sloped, and hence, the formal locus crosses the informal one from below at (θ∗,φ ∗).
This situation is shown in Fig.5, where it can be seen that the interior equilibrium is unique but
not stable in this case, while there exist two stable corner equilibria with informal and formal jobs
alone.
3.7 Discussion
Above we have found general conditions for existence of equilibria of diﬀerent types. It has been
shown that whenever both sides of the labour market - ﬁrms and workers - prefer formal (informal)
employment in the situation when they do not face matching problems, the resulting equilibrium
will comprise only formal (informal) jobs. However, if given full control of the labour market the
demand and supply sides diﬀer in their preferences over the sectors, frictions in matching can ensure
that there exists an interior equilibrium with both types of job so that ﬁrms become indiﬀerent as
to which sector to enter. This last result is especially important for two major reasons.
First, it shows the importance of labour market institutions, such as wage bargaining, for the
emergence of equilibria where two sectors coexist in the long run. Wages act as a channel through
which asymmetry in governmental regulations in relation to formal and informal ﬁrms leads to
market duality. Governmental regulations aﬀect the size of match surpluses in the two sectors, as
well as the outside options of both ﬁrms and workers in the wage bargaining process.
Second, such an interior equilibrium is obtained in the absence of speciﬁc ad hoc assumptions
about ex ante characteristics of workers, their preferences, or various externalities simply built in
models’ technologies to provide for formal-informal segmentation of the economy. All externalities
present in our model are derived from market interactions. This is in contrast with the previous
theoretical literature which overview was given in Section 2.
In the rest of this section we examine implications of the above analysis of the model and
emphasise the role of various assumptions for the outcomes we obtain. In particular, we expound on
the mechanism whereby government regulations, wage bargains and imperfect labour markets make
for the emergence of the informal sector in the long run. The section is concluded by touching upon
the issue of stability of the long-run equilibrium with formal and informal jobs before summarising
25the main points.
3.7.1 Important assumptions
An important meaning of the above analysis is that in a standard model of the labour market
it indeed reveals possibilities for stable coexistence of formal and informal sectors in the long
term. In the model, this result depends almost exclusively on the parameters reﬂecting the degree
of regulations of the economy (i.e. taxes, ﬁnes for running business informally, the degree of
monitoring), and costs to access a particular sector, kf and ki. It is likely that many (or even all) of
those parameters are eﬀective or potential policy tools in reality. At the same time, the outcome is
independent of, for example, preferences of workers over formal and informal goods, heterogeneity
of workers, production technology parameters, a form of a monitoring function or the penalty rate.
The result, however, hinges upon four important assumptions.
First, let us take the assumption of wage bargaining. It can be shown that dropping this
assumption and, for example, assuming ceteris paribus wage posting, leads to corner solutions.
Indeed, consider equilibrium wages in our model. The two zero proﬁt conditions (18) and (19)








+ rEu (θ,φ). (24)
That is, the equilibrium wage diﬀerential is






Wage posting can be seen as a situation, in which all the bargaining power is vested with ﬁrms, or,
in other words, β =0 . From (23) and (24) above it is clear that putting β equal to 0 eliminates the
equilibrium wage diﬀerential (25) and, thus, preconditions for labour market segmentation.
In constructing our model we keep in mind not advanced but transitional economies, so the
question arises of whether the assumption of wage bargaining is reasonable in the context of the
countries of Eastern Europe. The empirical studies by Grosfeld and Nivet (1999), Luke and Schaﬀer
(1999), Shakhnovich and Yudashkina (2001) provide evidence in full support of the presumption.
In the most recent work Basu et al. (2004) indicate that if at the end of the communist period
evidence of worker sharing in their enterprise rents and losses was a feature only in some transitional
economies, within a year after the start of transition rent sharing has become prevalent in all the
economies they study (which are the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary).
The second important assumption is the presence of search frictions. The modelling of matching
26between ﬁrms and workers hangs upon the form of matching technology. The Inada-type assump-
tions introduced in Section 3.2 are crucial to the existence of an interior equilibrium for parameter
values satisfying restrictions in regions 2 and 4, Fig.6. Nevertheless, such a speciﬁcation of the ag-
gregate matching function (which includes a Cobb-Douglas functional form) is generally favoured
by the empirical studies (for a review see, e.g., Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), while Stevens
(2004) provides microeconomic foundations for it.
Third is the irreversibility of ﬁrms’ decision on what type of job to open. The irreversibility can
ﬁrst be seen as a consequence of investing into capital of diﬀerent quality. If formal and informal
jobs use diﬀerent capital, then the irreversibility assumption is justiﬁed in the absence of a perfect
second-hand market for capital goods (as in Acemoglu, 2001). In other words, ﬁrms in either sector
have to bear some sunk costs before opening a vacancy, that can be seen as some sort of start-up
irreversible investments in capital. This point is supported by the evidence from the developing
world. For example, Loayza (1996) points to the fact that in developing countries with its endemic
ineﬃcient capital markets and the lack of proper contracts informal ﬁrms face high borrowing rates,
are unable to transfer property, and create common stock corporations. In such conditions even
if costs of informality grow and incentives to be formal become stronger, the more diﬃcult it is
for informal ﬁrms to accumulate the wealth that would enable them to enter the formal sector.
However, in the context of our model, entry investments are diﬀerent due to higher entry costs to
legality, not the quality of capital. Furthermore, the productivity of a match is the same across
sectors. In such conditions, the irreversibility of opening an informal vacancy can be justiﬁed by
the same reason as in the case with capital expenditure: turning formal requires more funds spent
on obtaining licenses, registration (we leave aside a question of opening of new vacancies by the
ﬁrms already existing in the market), etc. At the same time, downgrading from being formal to
being informal cannot be easily done due to the fact that, ﬁrst, some funds will have already been
spent on licenses and thus eﬀectively sunk, and, second, the merest disappearance of a formal ﬁrm
from the market not through a bankruptcy procedure is a big deal even in the countries where
bankruptcy procedures are not clearly stipulated.
Finally, the fourth important ingredient aﬀecting the results that we have obtained is some
degree of heterogeneity, which is present in our model. In particular, the formal and informal
sectors are diﬀerent in the access costs. This leads into heterogeneity of ﬁrms and hence possibilities
for labour market segmentation. However, in contrast to the approach taken in many theoretical
studies mentioned in Section 2, ﬁrms in our model are not ex ante heterogeneous. In other words,
the heterogeneity is not assumed exogenous but is derived from investment decisions of ﬁrms.
Moreover, the factor of heterogeneity, i.e. start-up costs, is a product of governmental regulations.
It can potentially be aﬀected by structural policies.
Thus, as one can see, all the assumptions we make are generally empirically justiﬁed. So, the
wages, or, more precisely, the wage determination process in the frictional labour markets can be
27critical in transmitting the eﬀect of governmental actions on the formal-informal divide. That said,
the model can be extended to include preferences of workers, sector good speciﬁcity (as was done,
e.g., in a similar study by Kolm and Larsen, 2004), moral costs (Kolm and Larsen, 2001; Fugazza
and Jacques, 2004), and so forth, which will not change the qualitative result, but will just distract
attention from main mechanisms in action. Formal regulations have a strong direct bearing on
long-term emergence of segmented labour markets when the economy is characterised by search
and rent sharing. We take this point further in the next subsection.
3.7.2 Regulations and non-competitive labour markets
From the most general perspective the various government regulations aimed at both formal and
informal sectors determine the size of a surplus that a potential match generates. These rents are
to be divided between the two parties forming a match - the ﬁrm and the worker. If we assume
a perfectly competitive benchmark, where matching between ﬁr m sa n dw o r k e r si si n s t a n t a n e o u s ,
ﬁrms hire workers at the same wage equal to their marginal product, and receive the rest of the
surplus. Clearly, there will be no equilibrium wage diﬀerences, while ﬁrms will prefer the sector
with a higher surplus, so that a corner equilibrium will result. As soon as we enter the world of
search, however, the fact that matching for both ﬁrms and workers takes time implies that there
will be some rent sharing in a bilateral monopoly game (as in, e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1984). In
such conditions a worker appropriates part of the match surplus, as a ﬁrm now has to compensate
the job-seeker for the time it would spend searching for a replacement if the worker quits the
negotiations to take her outside option. As our model suggests, depending on the parameters, such
as taxes, ﬁnes, and so forth, the match surpluses in the formal and informal sectors are not equal in
general, hence nor should potentially be the equilibrium wages. There is a scope for labour market
segmentation.
A higher surplus implies a higher wage in equilibrium, as can be seen, for example, from (14) and
(15). At the same time it implies higher proceeds to ﬁrms as well. Thus the sector which is more
attractive for its high surplus, is, at the same time, less attractive for its high labour costs. How does
this bear on the resulting equilibrium? The outcome depends on outside options or/and status-quo
positions of ﬁrms and workers in wage negotiations.20 If ﬁrms have the same threat points when
bargaining over wages in formal and informal sectors the Nash bargaining solution implies that
ﬁrms will choose a sector with a higher surplus. The same applies to workers. Then preferences
of ﬁrms and workers over the sector of employment, when they face no matching problem, are
driven by the sector surplus size and always coincide, i.e. only corner equilibria will be possible.
If, however, either party in the bargaining process has diﬀerent, i.e. sector speciﬁc outside options,
then in general it is not necessarily the case that the sector with the highest surplus is preferred
20The reader can be referred to Sutton (1986) for initial insights into the eﬀect of outside options in non-cooperative
bargaining theory.
28by both parties. For the party with sector speciﬁc status-quo positions the result depends on the
relative value of outside options and the relative value of sector surpluses. In such a situation the
preferences over the sector of production given the full bargaining power can potentially be diﬀerent
for ﬁrms and workers, depending on the extent of asymmetries. Suppose that the asymmetries are
on the side of the party that actually makes the decision as to which sector to enter (in the case
of our model it is the ﬁrms, whereas workers search randomly without choosing a particular sector
in advance). Then if in equilibrium these asymmetries in the outside options are levelled oﬀ by
wage diﬀerentials - an interior equilibrium arises where the entering party is just indiﬀerent as
to which sector is better. If, however, the potential wage diﬀerentials cannot compensate for the
asymmetries in the outside options the entering party will always prefer a particular sector, so that
a corner equilibrium results.
In our model the ﬁrms do have diﬀerent outside options depending on the sector when they
bargain over wages with workers. In particular, their options are deﬁned by the value of sunk start-
up costs, kf and ki, and eﬀective discount rates, π and ρ. The upfront expenditure kf and ki must
be borne before the ﬁrm meets a job-seeker, so that when it happens and wage bargaining starts the
expected ﬂow values of ﬁrm’s outside option are −πkf and −ρki in the formal and informal sectors,
respectively. Thus, what they care about when deciding on which sector to enter is not the size of




t h es a m et i m ew h a tm a t t e r sf o rw o r k e r si st h es i z eo fs u r p l u s e s ,Sf and Si. In particular, as seen
from (23) and (24), wages in formal and informal sectors depend positively on πkf and ρki, while
the diﬀerence between the two deﬁnes the equilibrium wage diﬀerential - see (25). In an interior




ρki, so ﬁrms can make zero proﬁts in both sectors.
Thus, asymmetries in ﬂow values of start-up costs are crucial for an interior equilibrium to
ensue. These asymmetries in our model are due to factors directly aﬀected by the state of the
government and its regulations. In particular, a value of kf higher than a value of ki is explained
by bureaucratic extortion, i.e. by corruption at the lower tier of government oﬃcials. A diﬀerential
between the eﬀective discount rates, π and ρ, is due to government monitoring activities that crack
down on the informal sector. From (23) and (24) it is easy to see that if, for some reason, πkf = ρki,




is determined by the relative value of surpluses, Sf and Si. Similarly, if, for instance, kf = ki =0
the wages in both sectors are equal to workers’ outside option rEu. In all such cases ﬁrms’ and
workers’ preferences over the sector of production are the same and only corner equilibria can result.
To sum up, search and rent sharing in the presence of asymmetries in start-up costs caused by
activities of various levels of the government, can bring about a long-term interior equilibrium with
formal and informal jobs. From Fig.4 and 5 we can see that such an equilibrium, when it exists, can
be either stable or unstable. The same asymmetries d i s c u s s e dh e r ep l a yal e a d i n gr o l ei ns t a b i l i t y
29of equilibrium too, which is a focus of the following section.
3.7.3 Notes on stability of an interior equilibrium
The analysis of Fig.4 and 5 in Section 3.6.3 shows that the stability of an interior equilibrium
depends on the sign and relative value of slopes of the two loci (21) and (22). Those in turn depend
on the sign of
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ and the relative value of πkf and ρki. Here, we provide insights into the
stability issue from the perspective of the eﬀect of the value of being unemployed, Eu(θ,φ), and
ﬂow values of start-up costs on wages, and hence, proﬁts in the formal and informal sector.
As we have seen in (23) and (24) the equilibrium wages paid by ﬁrms in the formal and infor-
mal sectors can be represented as a sum of two terms - the basis equivalent to worker’s outside
option, rEu, and the "top-up" term paid to a hired worker for saving of opportunity costs that a
representative ﬁrm enjoys when a job is formed.21
Proposition 1 and Appendix A ascertain that for kf >k i and π<ρthe value of being unem-
ployed is increasing in the proportion of formal vacancies, φ, in regions 2 and 4, Fig.6, around the
points of interior equilibria. Thus a second term in (23) and (24) is increasing in φ and θ.E i t h e r
ar i s ei nφ or θ (or in both) improves prospects of the unemployed. Such a change aﬀects both
the formal and informal wage in the same manner, but the cost of it is always higher to ﬁrms in
a sector with smaller surplus: the same absolute increase in φ or θ eats away a larger percentage
share of proﬁts in that sector.
At the same time, the top-up term is independent of φ and varies only with the market tightness,
θ. Both the absolute eﬀect of a change in θ and the eﬀect of such a change relative to the size of
sector surplus are always larger in the sector with a higher ﬂow value of start-up costs, i.e. with a
lower outside option to ﬁrms once entry costs have been sunk.
As ﬁrms enter the economy, market tightness θ rises, so that workers bid wages higher and
higher. It can be veriﬁed that in such a situation for low values of φ proﬁt margins of ﬁrms in the
sector with smaller surplus are reduced more slowly. This happens because the relative eﬀect on
such ﬁrms of a wage rise due to changes in the worker’s outside option, rEu, is dominated by the
relative top-up eﬀect in wage changes on proﬁts in the sector where outside options of ﬁrms are
lower.22 Eventually, as the ﬁrms in the latter sector break even, the ﬁrms in the other sector still
make positive proﬁts, even though in absolute value their surplus is lower. Thus, the proportion of
21The value of the ﬁrst term in the expressions for equilibrium wages (23) and (24) depends on the average duration
of a vacancy. This represents the worker’s compensation for saving ﬁrms the opportunity costs. Indeed, from the
discussion in Section 3.6.1 it follows that when θ → 0 and q(θ) →∞ , the equilibrium converges to the Walrasian limit
p o i n t ,a n db o t hw a g e swf and wi converge to the value of being unemployed, rEu. In this case resources invested
before entrance never remain idle and workers are not compensated for saving of opportunity costs. If, however,
θ>0 workers have to be compensated as the opportunity costs of idleness are signiﬁcant. In the other extreme case,
i.e. when θ →∞and q(θ) → 0, the opportunity costs of idleness become very high, wages grow large, until workers
appropriate all the sector surpluses.
22Conditions for the existence of an interior equilibrium imply that a sector with a lower surplus and a sector with
al o w e rﬁrms’ outside option are necessarily diﬀerent.
30vacancies posted by such ﬁrms rises.
In contrast, as wages change at high values of φ, the relative eﬀect of the worker’s outside option
on ﬁrms in the sector with lower surplus outweighs the relative top-up eﬀect on ﬁrms in the sector
where their outside options are lower, so that ﬁrms in the sector with smaller surplus suﬀer more
as their proﬁts dwindle away faster as θ rises. The proportion of vacancies posted by these ﬁrms
decreases. The two eﬀects are exactly balanced at the equilibrium level of the proportion of formal
vacancies, φ∗.T h u s ,f o ra l lφ<φ ∗, the top-up eﬀect dominates the worker’s outside option eﬀect,
and for all φ>φ ∗, the worker’s outside option eﬀect dominates the top-up eﬀect.
The workings of the two eﬀects imply that an interior equilibrium in Fig.4 is stable. Indeed,




while the size of the match surplus is greater for informal ﬁrms, Sf <S i. This implies that the
top-up eﬀect is greater in the informal sector, as πkf <ρ k i. Then for any φ<φ ∗, working through
wages the top-up eﬀect on informal proﬁt margins dominates the worker’s outside option eﬀect on
formal proﬁt margins, and thus it is the formal ﬁrms that post more and more vacancies in the
economy. Thus, φ rises. On the other hand, if φ>φ ∗, the worker’s outside option eﬀect on formal
ﬁrms is greater than the top-up eﬀect in the informal sector, so that informal ﬁrms post more
vacancies than their formal counterparts, i.e. φ decreases. Once φ reaches the value of φ∗ ﬁrms
in both sectors break even at precisely the same level of market tightness, θ∗, which is, thus, the
equilibrium value. By similar reasoning the interior equilibrium in Fig.5 is unstable.
The main implication of the discussion in this subsection is that asymmetries in start-up costs
or/and match duration (which is reﬂected in diﬀerent value of eﬀective discount rates π and ρ) along
with the asymmetries in sector surpluses, lead through wage bargaining to either stable or unstable
outcomes. Again, search and rent sharing are crucial to the results, while speciﬁcc o m b i n a t i o n so f
various parameters (kf,k i,π , ρ, and other parameters determining the size of surpluses Sf and Si)
deﬁne the stable outcome.
3.7.4 Summary
The purpose of this section has been to highlight the role of governmental regulations and labour
market institutions in the emergence of a stable long-run equilibrium with both formal and informal
sectors. We have deliberately concentrated on that type of equilibrium, because corner equilibria
with formal or informal sectors alone are not particularly interesting from a policy perspective. On
the one hand, the absence of informality in the long term, implies that informalisation is just a
transitional phenomenon of adjustment in the economy. On the other hand, equilibria with the
informal sector alone are likely to be unrealistic because governments may have numerous incentives
to avoid complete informalisation of the economy: in addition to a number of insights mentioned in
the introductory sections, the obvious intuition is that raising revenues through tax collection (i.e.
from the tax-compliant sector) implies lower transaction costs than so doing through monitoring
31of the underground businesses (see, e.g. Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002).
We have shown that regulations and policies towards formal and informal ﬁrms imply diﬀerent
rents of functioning across sectors. When labour markets are imperfect and characterised by search
and rent sharing, surplus diﬀerentials can lead to equilibrium wage diﬀerentials and, hence, labour
market segmentation. This result is important, because in general it does not depend on further
assumptions about preferences of workers, heterogeneity of ﬁrms or employees, a speciﬁcf o r mo f
penalty function, etc. All those factors can be successfully incorporated into the model, which
however, will keep its main implications intact.
Search and rent sharing have recently become popular for modelling an interaction between
ﬁrms and workers through which informality can emerge. Kolm and Larsen (2001, 2004), Boeri
and Garibaldi (2001), Bouev (2002), and Fugazza and Jacques (2004) have all studied various
versions of a labour market search model à la Pissarides (2000) with an application to the informal
sector. However, the main focus of these studies is policy implications and the eﬀect of the informal
sector and governmental regulations on the level of employment and unemployment. The role of
search and rent sharing in the emergence of the informal sector has not been accentuated nor
properly analysed.
While the existence of frictions in the formal labour market should cause no doubts (see, e.g.
Acemoglu, 1996, 1999, for references to important sources of evidence), Fugazza and Jacques (2004)
point out that there is some indication that favours application of the same approach to modelling
of informal labour markets. In this work, however, we do not separate labour markets from the
point of view of the worker, who is assumed to search randomly. We postulate that it is ﬁrms that
decide in the end in which sector to function. This could well have been a feature of transitional
labour markets in Eastern Europe and, especially, Russia, where job-seekers might have been happy
to obtain any oﬀer of employment in the face of rising transitional unemployment.23
Wage bargaining is also inherent in many advanced European economies. At the same time there
is substantial evidence that it is pertinent to transitional countries as well. It is often emphasised
that workers can have enough power to push up wages in response to gains in productivity and, thus,
appropriate some of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc rents, which leads to losses of resources otherwise available
for further investment (e.g., Grosfeld and Nivet, 1999; Shakhnovich and Yudashkina, 2001). So,
rent sharing and its role in wage diﬀerentials across the two sectors should be given more close
attention.
We have found that diﬀerentials in two factors are especially important for equilibrium wage
diﬀerences and, hence, the existence and stability of an interior equilibrium.
First is the diﬀerence in the eﬀective discount rates in formal and informal sectors, that can be
due to government audit of informal ﬁrms. Monitoring of the underground sector leading to a higher
23This posit has to be veriﬁed empirically. However, some general discussions - see, for instance, Boeri (2000) or
Gërxhani (2004) - indicate that in transitional countries informality is often of subsistence nature, thus suggesting
that workers hardly direct their search to the informal sector purposely.
32death rate of informal matches has featured in the models by Boeri and Garibaldi (2001), Bouev
(2002), and Kolm and Larsen (2001, 2004). Empirical evidence from less developed countries
also corroborates the view of higher labour turnover in the underground sector (Kaufmann and
Kaliberda, 1996; Hoek, 2002). Our analysis shows that diﬀerences in turnover rates across formal
and informal sectors have a direct bearing on the equilibrium wage diﬀerential, provided that ﬁrms
are subject to some costs of posting a vacancy.
Second is the diﬀerentials in costs of vacancy posting themselves. The higher costs of access
to the formal sector are widely featured in the descriptive literature on the informal sector (de
Soto, 1989, is the most popular reference). Here, we incorporate them to show that such costs
lead to equilibrium wage diﬀerences, and hence, labour market segmentation. Interestingly, it can
be shown that the conclusions of the model hold even in the absence of the start-up costs, but in
t h ep r e s e n c eo fv a r y i n gﬂow costs of maintaining a vacancy in either sector. Whenever wages are
determined by ex post Nash bargaining what is important for the ensuing wage diﬀerentials is that
ﬁrms have to invest some resources, e.g. spent them on preserving the vacancy, before they meet
workers, so that they care about opportunity costs of their investments.
Thus, wage diﬀerentials and, hence, diﬀerences in labour costs are an important feature of
formal-informal segmentation. Castells and Portes (1989) have noted that one of the best-known
eﬀects of the informalisation process is to reduce costs of labour substantially. It is widely held that
such costs can be derived from minimum wages, high social security contributions, redundancy pay,
fringe beneﬁts, constraints on free hiring and dismissal (see inter alia Loayza, 1996; Schneider and
Enste, 2000; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2001). Our model emphasises another aspect of labour costs that
assists the emergence of informality. Namely, in the presence of wage bargaining and rent sharing,
workers may well have a monopoly power in wage negotiations to extract rewards for saving of
opportunity costs that results from ﬁrms’ having invested in vacancy creation before meeting with
job-seekers. In fact, this points to the presence in our set-up of a version of the seminal hold-up
problem (see Grout, 1984; Williamson, 1985), when workers share in returns on investment borne
by the other party, i.e. ﬁrms. We shall return to this question in the next section when we address
some eﬃciency issues arising in our model.
4 Welfare and Policy Making
Now that we have established the role of wage bargaining in the emergence of formal-informal
duality we shall consider implications of our model for policy making and address some eﬃciency
questions that arise in such models of labour markets with search frictions.
334.1 Implications for Policies
Equilibria in our model emerge as a result of bargaining between workers and ﬁrms over gains that
productive matches generate in the two sectors. The government has a direct impact on the outcome
of this process by aﬀecting either the size of the surpluses in the sectors or the outside options of
negotiating sides (or both), as can be seen from Section 3.7. What does this framework imply for
policies that the government could implement to drive the economy to a long-run equilibrium of a
particular type?
Consider, for example, a policy-maker who wants to choose a combination of policy instruments
to support the formal sector. That is, suppose that the policy-maker, or the government for that
matter, wants to avoid in the long run the equilibrium with informal jobs (i.e. the one as in Fig.3),
and aims to attain, if possible, the equilibrium with formal jobs only (Fig.2). Also, for simplicity,
suppose that all but one parameters of the model are ﬁxed, and the policy-maker is eﬀectively to
decide only on the level of, for instance, the tax rate, τ. What does our model have to say about
the level that the tax rate must be set to guarantee convergence to a purely formal equilibrium in
the long term? Or, more generally, what is the eﬀect of a variation in the tax rate on the type
of the resulting equilibrium? In answering these questions we shall proceed in the following way.
Section 3.6.3 above has provided us with conditions on the parameters of the model that make for
diﬀerent types of equilibrium. Thus, by reformulating the restrictions on sector surpluses Sf and
Si, and their respective returns,
Sf
πkf and Si
ρki, as restrictions on the level of the tax rate, τ, we can
determine what values of the tax rate correspond to diﬀerent equilibria. Having done that we shall
see what implications our exercise can suggest for economic policies, which purpose is assumed to
be delivering the economy to the equilibrium without informality. In what follows we shall not,
however, consider implications for the state budget - these are touched on in Section 4.2.
4.1.1 Restrictions on the tax rate
By carefully examining the conditions corresponding to regions 1-4, Fig.6, it becomes clear that
given the relative value of the outside options of ﬁrms in wage bargains, i.e. −πkf and −ρki,
ceteris paribus not all four situations are equally possible. In particular, it is easy to see that if,
for example, πkf <ρ k i, only equilibria in regions 1, 2 and 3, Fig.6, are feasible, whereas equilibria
in region 4 are not possible (given πkf <ρ k i one cannot have Sf >S i and, at the same time,
Sf
πkf > Si
ρki). By contrast, if πkf >ρ k i, only equilibria in regions 1, 3, and 4 in Fig.6 can come
about.
Suppose that πkf <ρ k i, which means that ceteris paribus ﬁrms in the formal sector are better
oﬀ than ﬁrms in the informal sector in wage negotiations with workers. From the shorthand
notation for sector ﬂow surpluses, Sf and Si, introduced in Section 3.6.1, and the condition that




1 =( ρki − πkf)+mF and τH
2 =
(y−bu)
ρki (ρki − πkf)+mF
πkf
ρki ; super-index "H" is introduced
34to indicate that we are dealing with the case when formal ﬁrms enjoy a higher reservation option
than their informal counterparts. By the same token, equilibria in region 2 come about when
τH
1 <τ<τ H
2 . Finally, equilibria in region 3 occur when τH
1 <τ H
2 <τ.
So, the three types of equilibrium result when the tax rate falls in one of the three non-
overlapping regions, which borders are deﬁned by τH
1 and τH
2 . As we know, equilibria in region
1h a v eo n l yf o r m a lﬁrms present in the market, equilibria in region 2 are mixed, while equilibria
in region 3 are purely informal. Thus, the restrictions on the tax rate indicate that while having
other parameters ﬁxed, a tax rate above τH
2 leads to an equilibrium comprising only informal jobs,
ar a t eb e l o wτH
1 makes for an equilibrium with formal jobs alone, while the values of τ in between
τH
1 and τH
2 generate interior equilibria with both formal and informal ﬁrms present.
Consider now a situation when πkf >ρ k i, i.e. formal ﬁrms are now worse oﬀ in wage ne-
gotiations than the informal ones, all other things being equal. In this case, only equilibria in
regions 1, 3, and 4 in Fig.6 can come about. Again, from the deﬁnition of Sf and Si and the






ρki (ρki − πkf)+mF
πkf
ρki ,τ L
2 = mF +( ρki − πkf), and super-index "L" indicates
t h ec a s ew h e nt h eo u t s i d eo p t i o no ff o r m a lﬁrms is lower than that of the informal ﬁrms. Similarly,
equilibria in region 3 are possible under condition τL
1 <τ L




Similarly to the case with πkf <ρ k i, a tax rate above the upper bound τL
2 implies getting into
the region 3, i.e. where only long-run equilibria with the informal sector alone are possible, while
a rate below the lower bound, τL
1, brings the economy into region 1, where the informal sector is
eliminated in equilibrium. The values of the tax rate in between τL
1 and τL
2 make for equilibria in
region 4. In this latter case, since the interior equilibrium is not stable, a likely long-run outcome
is either a purely formal or a purely informal equilibrium: much depends on the initial proportion
of formal vacancies in the economy when it starts converging to the long-run destination. A higher
initial proportion of formal vacancies increases chances of getting into an equilibrium with formal
jobs alone (Fig.5).
4.1.2 Implications
The two cases just considered provide several implications for economic policy. We discuss them
in turn below. The ﬁrst one relates, in particular, to the eﬀe c to ft h el e v e lo ft h et a xr a t eo nt h e
probability of ending up in the equilibrium with formal jobs alone. Other implications are of a
more general interest and highlight speciﬁcity of policy making in the two-sector economy where
wages are determined by bargaining.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding that can readily be discovered from analysing the restrictions on the tax
rate above indicate that lower tax rates raise the odds of ending up in an equilibrium without the
informal sector. This echoes a standard conclusion often made in the literature related to our topic.
35In particular, it is widely held that higher taxes always increase an incentive for informalisation
(see, for instance, Johnson et al., 1997; Friedman et al., 2000). Thus, in general governments that
aim to weed out informality in the longer term should avoid excessively high tax rates. As seen
from the above, however, the margins that allow one to call a tax rate "excessively high", depend on
the relation between outside options of ﬁrms bargaining over wages in formal and informal sectors.
Obviously, in general, τL
2 and τH
2 are not equal to each other, hence the same tax rate may well be
excessively high under one condition (say πkf >ρ k i) but not so under the other (πkf <ρ k i). This
is a matter of the second implication.
The cases πkf >ρ k i and πkf <ρ k i are mutually exclusive. Still,h o w e v e r ,f r o mt h ea n a l y s i so f
the border values τL
1,τ L
2,τ H
1 , and τH





2 . This implies that there can exist some tax rate τ∗ such that τL
2 <τ ∗ <τ H
1 ,
and that leads the economy to an equilibrium with informal jobs alone when πkf >ρ k i, but to
an equilibrium without the underground sector when πkf <ρ k i. Moreover, if the economy starts
at some τ∗ <τ L
1, and the government wants to achieve a long-run equilibrium without informal
jobs, but needs for some purpose to increase taxes, it should be more cautious about raising the
level of τ∗ too much when πkf >ρ k i holds, rather than when πkf <ρ k i maintains. In other
words, a "safety margin" for the tax increase is broader in the latter situation. Thus, in general
governments can aﬀo r dt ol e v yh i g h e rt a xr a t e so nf o r m a lﬁrms when πkf <ρ k i, and still drive
the economy to an equilibrium without informal jobs. To put it diﬀerently, when the bargaining
position of formal ﬁrms vis-à-vis workers in wage negotiations is stronger in the formal sector,
governments can appropriate a larger part of the match surplus by levying higher taxes, and still
eradicate informality eventually. Thus, in this case, other things being equal, ﬁrms appropriate
more rents while haggling with workers over wages, while the government takes these gains away
through taxation.
The third implication is derived from factors aﬀecting the border values τL
1,τ L
2,τ H
1 , and τH
2 .
They all inter alia depend on the size of the expected ﬁne for running business informally, mF,
and costs of bribing in the formal sector, kf. Thus, the tax rate cannot be "excessively high" per
se, but rather in relation to the potential ﬁne levied on informal ﬁrms or/and an additional burden
of bureaucratic extortion in the formal sector. This is well in line with some empirical ﬁndings
indicating that higher taxes do not necessarily correspond to a higher share of the informal sector
(see e.g. Friedman et al., 2000). Contribution of other factors to an increase (or a decrease for that
matter) in the size of shadow economy can prevail over the eﬀect of taxes. For instance, Friedman
et al. (2000) point out that entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid oﬃcial taxes but to reduce
the burden of bureaucracy and corruption. In our model, application of their logic would imply that
the higher such costs are, the higher is kf, and the more likely it is that πkf >ρ k i. Hence, higher
t a x e si ns u c has i t u a t i o na r ep e r c e i v e db yf o r m a lﬁrms as more onerous which makes their move
underground more likely. As regards the relative eﬀect of taxes in the formal sector and expected
36ﬁnes in the informal economy, Bouev (2004) in a dynamic model of transition from plan to market
in the presence of the informal sector illustrates that it is not higher taxes per se that lead the
economy to an equilibrium with informal ﬁrms, but rather the burden they create on formal ﬁrms
in comparison with factors aﬀecting productivity growth in the shadow economy.
Finally, the last but not the least implication of our model is that the government itself can
aﬀect the regime or situation in which it occurs. In other words, governments do possess ways and
means of setting relative values of πkf and ρki. Indeed, this can be done, for example, through
some structural or administrative reform that would reduce the scope for corruption in the economy,
and thus decrease the value of kf, and, hence, increase the outside option of formal ﬁrms in wage
bargains with workers. However, a more straightforward and, possibly, less costly method is to aﬀect
the eﬀectiveness of the informal sector monitoring, m, which can be accomplished, for example,
through ﬁnancing of the tax police or other similar authorities. Recall that ρ = π+m as introduced
in Section 3.6.1. Thus, by varying the value of m the government in fact aﬀects the size of the
outside option of ﬁrms bargaining with workers over wages in the informal sector. It is easy to
verify that for all mL such that mL <m ∗, the case πkf >ρ k i will result, while for all mH
such that m∗ <m H, the case πkf <ρ k i will take place, where m∗ is such that πkf = ρki, i.e.
m∗ =
π(kf−ki)
ki . In this simple model, after choosing a level of monitoring the government can then
easily determine the border values of τ and choose a level of taxation, and, thus, foreordain a desired

















will still maintain. A consequence
of these relationships and the previous implications, other things being equal, can be that in the
economies with a high level of bureaucratic extortion, or/and where higher taxes are favoured by
the public oﬃce, governments may well need to spend more on the monitoring of the informal
sector or/and levy higher ﬁnes for running informal businesses. This would make convergence to
equilibria without the informal sector more likely. At the same time, in the economies with a priori
highly eﬀective audit of the informal sector (high m) governments are likely to be more ﬂexible in
setting tax rates, as a wider "safety margin" would allow them to achieve formal equilibria with
greater probability. It should be noted, however, that in a more realistic modelling the eﬃciency of
audit or monitoring, m, is itself likely to be a function of collected taxes, because it can be seen as
representing a public good provided by the state. Then the determination of the border values of
τ will be much more complicated and will depend on the form of the function m(τ). Implications
for government behaviour will also be more complex.
4.1.3 Summary
Let us now summarise the above discussion. Our model indicates that, while keeping other param-
eters ﬁxed, each type of long-run equilibrium is univocally related to a range of tax rates, which
does not overlap with similar ranges for other types of equilibria under this ﬁxed set of param-
37eters. In general, higher tax rates raise the probability that an equilibrium with informal jobs
alone will occur. However, the precise eﬀect (the type of equilibrium) of choosing a particular tax
rate depends on relative values of reservation options of formal and informal ﬁrms in their wage
bargaining with workers. So, whenever formal ﬁrms enjoy a stronger position in wage bargaining
with job-seekers than their informal counterparts do, governments can, in principle, aﬀord to set
higher tax rates while achieving the same type of equilibrium, other things being equal. As the
reservation option of ﬁrms in the formal sector depends on the costs of bribing, it implies that in
more corrupt economies ﬁrms are less determine to cope with high taxes and more likely to go
underground - in other words, higher taxes are more likely to lead to long-run equilibria with the
informal sector if the level of bribing is high. Meanwhile, the reservation option of ﬁrms in the
informal sector depends on the probability of being caught by monitoring authorities, such as the
tax police. So, if the level of monitoring of the underground sector is high, higher taxes are less
likely to lead to long-run equilibria with the informal sector, i.e. in general governments should be
less restricted as to the choice of tax rates in such economies. Thus, an important implication is
that the government can itself aﬀect the likely eﬀect of changing the tax rate by inﬂuencing the
outside options of ﬁrms - it can either be done by pursuing reforms aimed at a reduction in severity
of corruption in the economy or, which may be easier to accomplish, by choosing some level of
monitoring of the informal sector. Finally, while we have discussed the inﬂuence of government on
reservation options of ﬁrms, we have not said anything about its impact on reservation options of
workers. Obviously, our arguments as regards the tax rate can easily be appropriately reformulated
for any of the parameters captured by shorthand notation Sf and Si, including the unemployment
beneﬁts, bu, - the instrument which aﬀects the value of worker’s outside option. However, it should
be noted, that as workers search randomly in our set-up, i.e. they do not diﬀerentiate between
vacancies coming from the formal and informal sectors, a change in bu aﬀects wage negotiations in
both sectors in the same manner. So, focusing on the ability to inﬂuence ﬁrms’ reservation values
is far more important.
In this section we have assumed that elimination of the informal sector is what governments
want to achieve in the long run. However, this is not necessarily the objective governments do or
should pursue in reality. We leave the question of what governments actually do want to achieve
beyond the scope of this essay - the reader can be referred to Buchanan (1975) and Shleifer and
Vishny (1998) for some discussions of possible motivation that governments could have. In what
follows, we rather attempt to provide some insights into whether the elimination of the informal
sector can be justiﬁed on the eﬃciency grounds. In particular, for convenience we mainly focus on
an interior equilibrium with both formal and informal jobs (such as the one that results in region
2, Fig.6, and is shown in Fig.4) - a most complicated stable steady state that can occur in our
model in the long run. This steady state is also an interim case between two degenerate equilibria
with formal and informal jobs alone. We shall assess its eﬃciency properties and look into what
38benevolent governments should do to achieve eﬃcient or sub-eﬃcient outcomes if they start out in
such an equilibrium.
4.2 Implications for Welfare
The welfare analysis below is structured in the following way. We begin it by investigating the
general conditions under which equilibria in our economy are eﬃcient, i.e. represent ﬁrst-best
optima in terms of maximisation of a welfare function reﬂecting gains of private agents, i.e. ﬁrms
and workers. This provides us with understanding of the underlying causes of potential ineﬃciency.
Then we look into the possibility of achieving ﬁrst-best solutions or, at least, making them more
probable. We are interested in what the benevolent government24 can do for correcting the causes
of ineﬃciency. At the same time, we learn the implications of those measures for the presence
or the size of the informal sector in steady state. If, however, attainment of ﬁrst-best allocations
is not realistic, it makes sense to analyse what the government can do to lead the economy to a
sub-optimal outcome as opposed to a ﬁrst-best one. In particular, it is interesting whether or not
a reduction in size of informality can improve on welfare if the economy starts out in the interior
equilibrium.
Before embarking on a substantive part of the eﬃciency analysis, however, we need to introduce
some measure of economic welfare.
4.2.1 Steady state surplus
Consider a private surplus, as customary in search-in-the-labour-market models (see, e.g., Hosios,
1990; Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999; Pissarides, 2000; Acemoglu, 2001):
Ξ(θ,φ)=N (y − τ − πkf)+I (y − mF − ρki) − θU (φrkf +( 1− φ)rki)+Ubu. (26)
This measure is what ﬁrms and workers care about before entering the economy. The surplus is equal
to ﬂows of net output generated in formal and informal sectors plus the income of the unemployed.
In particular, it consists of the number of workers in formal jobs, N =( 1− U)φ δ+m
δ+φm, times the
formal sector output net of taxes and ﬂow costs of creating a vacancy, y−τ−πkf, plus the number of
workers in informal jobs, I =( 1− U)(1− φ) δ
δ+φm, times the informal sector output less expected
ﬁnes and ﬂow vacancy costs, y − mF − ρki, minus the ﬂow costs of job creation to formal and
informal vacancies (respectively, θUφrkf and θU(1−φ)rki), plus total ﬂow beneﬁts received by the
unemployed, Ubu. Notice that the proportion of formal vacancies among all vacancies, φ, and the
proportion of ﬁlled formal jobs among all ﬁlled jobs, φ δ+m
δ+φm, do not coincide due to diﬀerent job
duration rates in diﬀerent sectors. Also, it can be shown that U =
δ(δ+m)
(δ(δ+m)+α(θ)(δ+φm)),t h es t o c k
24Throughout this section we assume that the government is benevolent in the sense that its aim is to maximise
social welfare represented by gains of ﬁrms and workers, rather than to pursue other objectives, such as, for example,
maximisation of the budget revenue.
39of unemployed workers in steady state, is in fact a function of θ and φ. The derivation of all these
results is relegated to Appendix A. Here we shall just note that the private surplus is a measure of
what the social planner should be concerned about in steady state, disregarding a speciﬁcw a yt h a t
wages are determined in equilibrium. Indeed as Pissarides (2000, p.184) notes: "the social planner
is not interested in wages, since wages determine only the distribution of output and distributional
consideration are excluded from the social welfare function."
4.2.2 Ineﬃciency of corner equilibria: a standard result
In order to provide the reader with a useful background to our main results for the economy with
two sectors let us start the analysis of eﬃciency with examination of a corner equilibrium. In such
a somewhat degenerate case, whether it is an equilibrium with formal jobs only (Fig.2) or the one
with informal jobs only (Fig.3), it is eﬀectively a one sector environment. So, not surprisingly, the
implications for eﬃciency of corner equilibria in our model are standard to the literature on search
in the labour market (Pissarides, 2000), that for the most part concentrates on an economy with
o n et y p eo fe m p l o y m e n t .
In a search economy with one sector the eﬃciency of an equilibrium would imply that the
relative amount of search, represented by the ratio of the number of vacancies to the number of
job-seekers, is optimal. As we focus here on the decision of ﬁrms to enter the economy, the eﬃciency
of equilibrium can be said to imply that the economy creates the right number of jobs. The standard
result in the search-in-the-labour-market literature is that the socially optimal amount of search
or job creation, for that matter, is achieved if the so-called Hosios (1990) eﬃciency condition is
maintained. In particular, it is known that in search equilibrium in a one sector economy there will
be too little job creation if the bargaining power of workers, β, is greater than the elasticity of the
matching function, η(θ)=−q0 (θ) θ
q(θ), and there will be too much job creation if β is less than the
elasticity of the matching function, η (θ). In order the allocation of jobs and workers to be eﬃcient
in models of search, ﬁrst, matching must exhibit constant returns, and, second, the elasticity of the
matching function with respect to unemployment must be equal to the bargaining power of workers
(Hosios, 1990; Pissarides, 2000). To see that this applies as well to the case of a corner equilibrium
with formal jobs in our model (a case with informal jobs is easy to analyse by analogy), consider a







e−rt(N (y − τ − πkf) − θUrkf + Ubu)dt (27)
25Following Pissarides (2000) the approach that we take in the comparison of the social and private outcomes is to
derive the social outcome by ignoring wage bargaining equations (8) and (9), and then investigate whether there are
wage rates determined according to (8) and (9) that make the social and private conditions for job creation identical.
40subject to restrictions
·
N = α(θ)φU − δN,
·
U = δN − α(θ)U,
1=N + U. (28)
Equation (27) is the private surplus (26) discounted back to the initial time and when I =0 .
Restrictions (28) are standard equations describing the evolution of unemployment and formal
sector employment: an increase in a number of workers in a particular labour market state is
equal to the ﬂow into that state minus the outﬂow. The solution of the programme is relegated to








At the same time, from the zero proﬁt condition (18) and (20) it follows that the level of the market





The two expressions (29) and (30) are identical if and only if α0 (θ)=( 1− β)q(θ) or, recalling
properties of α(θ) and q(θ),β=
q(θ)−α0(θ)
q(θ) = −q0 (θ) θ
q(θ) = η(θ). In other words, the corner
equilibrium in our model is eﬃcient if and only if the Hosios eﬃciency condition is satisﬁed.
An intuition underlying this result is as follows. The elasticity of the matching function η(θ)
can be seen as a measure of relative eﬀectiveness of the unemployed in making contacts, while
1−η(θ) is a measure of relative eﬀectiveness of ﬁrms in making contacts. From Shaked and Sutton
(1984) we know that in search economies with wage bargaining the relative bargaining position of
ﬁrms vis-à-vis workers depends on the time it takes a ﬁrm to switch, if necessary, from the worker
it currently bargains with to a substitute workforce. In models with matching functions this time
is a function of q(θ). The lower is q(θ) the longer is the time that ﬁrms have to wait for a worker,
and the weaker is the bargaining position of ﬁrms in bargaining with workers they have already
met. In other words, in labour markets characterised by search workers have more monopoly power
over extracting the match surplus the longer ﬁrms have to wait to ﬁll the vacancy, i.e. the lower
is q(θ), or the greater is θ, for that matter. Thus, as η(θ) reﬂects the relative eﬀectiveness of the
unemployed vis-à-vis ﬁrms in searching for a match, it can also be seen as a measure of worker’s
monopoly power, implied by the labour market conditions, over the surplus of the match to be
41shared in wage bargains. Hence, if, for instance, η(θ) is higher than β in equilibrium, then ﬁrms
in practice receive a greater share of the surplus in bargaining than they should have done if the
split were arranged by the social planner. The asymmetry between the monopoly power in wage
bargains commensurate with labour market conditions, η(θ), and the going bargaining power of
workers, β, causes ﬁrms to open more vacancies in the equilibrium than it is socially optimal.
That is ﬁrms are taking advantage of this asymmetry by overinvesting in job creation. This, of
course, would imply that at the margin ﬁrms are causing more congestion to each other than the
congestion that the unemployed are causing to other unemployed workers. In contrast, if β>η(θ),
ﬁrms will underinvest in job creation as the going bargaining power of workers, β, will be greater
than the one that would be justiﬁed by labour market frictions. Only in the case when β = η(θ)
the equilibrium is socially optimal, so the Hosios eﬃciency condition balances out the going and
true bargaining positions of workers in wage negotiations. From a slightly diﬀerent point of view it
also internalises all congestion externalities that ﬁrms and workers create to each other in labour
markets characterised by time-consuming search.
The moral of this exposition is that in general even the simplest outcome in our model, i.e. the
corner equilibrium, should not be expected to be eﬃcient. Eﬃciency hinges upon the particular
choice of the bargaining power of workers. Although it is a standard result, from a perspective of
t h ed i s c u s s i o no ft h ew e l f a r ei m p a c to fp o l i c i e sr e ducing the size of informality it is important that
ineﬃciency is not caused by a particular combination of policy parameters set by the government,
it is essentially of labour market origins.
Now let us investigate the interior equilibrium and see what lessons for eﬃciency of the steady
state outcome we can derive from there.
4.2.3 Ineﬃciency of the interior equilibrium
Our economy has two sectors so that if a non-degenerate outcome occurs with both formal and
informal jobs present in equilibrium the concept of eﬃciency becomes a little more advanced. With
two sectors the eﬃciency of equilibrium implies not only that the right number of jobs is created, but
also that jobs are allocated optimally across the sectors. However, our main result below indicates
that in contrast to the corner equilibrium case, in the interior equilibrium the allocation of jobs is
generally not optimal even when matching exhibits constant returns (as we have assumed) and the
Hosios condition holds. Indeed, it turns out that in the interior equilibrium with both formal and
informal jobs such as in Fig.4 or 5, the restriction on the bargaining power is no longer enough to
guarantee eﬃciency. There exist other factors responsible for creating another type of ineﬃciency,
and which bring about a non-optimal allocation of jobs and workers across the two sectors. With
this type of allocative ineﬃciency ﬁrms underinvest in job creation in a particular sector. As a
consequence, the amount of job creation in the economy as a whole is not optimal either.
Consider a stable long-run outcome in Fig.4, and continue along the lines of the analysis of the










N = α(θ)φU − δN,
·
U = δN +( δ + m)I − α(θ)U,
·
I = α(θ)(1 − φ)U − (δ + m)I,
1=N + I + U. (32)
The presence of the informal sector in the interior equilibrium implies that the number of re-
strictions is increased as compared to (28) to account for the ﬂows into and out of the informal
sector. Otherwise, the problem is similar to the programme (27)-(28). The solution to the problem
(31) subject to restrictions (32) is a socially optimal outcome. By inspecting the ﬁrst order condi-
tions of this programme it is straightforward to ascertain that the interior equilibrium does not in
general belong to the set of optimal outcomes. The detailed analysis is relegated to Appendix A,
while here we just discuss its main ﬁndings and implications.
Main ﬁndings The ﬁrst result obtained in the appendix is that in the interior equilibrium the
relationship between the bargaining power of workers and the elasticity of the matching function
matters not only for the total amount of job creation but also for distribution of jobs across the two
sectors. In particular, ceteris paribus if the going bargaining power of workers, β, is less than the
bargaining power of workers implied by the labour market conditions, η(θ), ﬁrms will overinvest in
job creation in the informal sector. If, however, β>η(θ) ﬁrms will tend to underinvest in creation
of informal jobs.
Second, misallocation of jobs across the two sectors in our economy occurs not only when the
Hosios condition fails. Even if it maintains and β = η(θ), ﬁrms tend to underinvest in creation of
formal jobs due to diﬀerences in start-ups costs such as kf >k i.
Third, the total amount of job creation in the interior equilibrium is always below the private
optimum. In other words, it can be shown that for any choice of the bargaining power β there is
too little job creation in the economy.
Finally, it is possible to see that, ﬁrst, the Hosios condition is necessary, but not suﬃcient for
eﬃciency of the interior equilibrium in terms of maximisation of the private surplus, and, second,
43that the suﬃcient condition for eﬃciency is that both the Hosios condition is met and kf = ki.26
An implication of these results is that in the two sector environment in general two factors aﬀect
both the total amount of job creation in the economy and the allocation of jobs across formal and
informal sectors. First is the standard relation between the bargaining power of workers and the
elasticity of the matching function. The second factor is the relation between the start-up costs
that ﬁrms bear before entering the economy. Let us consider them in turn.
The eﬀect of the relation between β and η(θ) on the total amount of job creation is standard
and similar to the case of a one sector environment discussed above. More interesting is its role in
creating allocative ineﬃciencies across the sectors. Our results suggest, intuitively, that ﬁrms tend
to take advantage of their bargaining position vis-à-vis workers in the sector where surplus of a
match is greater. Indeed, recall that in the stable interior equilibrium, as in Fig.4, Si >S f.A tt h e
same time, if β<η (θ) ﬁrms gain additional rents because of the discrepancy between the going
bargaining power of workers and the one implied by the labour market conditions. Those rents
are larger in the informal sector, so ﬁrms create too many informal jobs. By contrast, if β>η(θ)
ﬁrms miss out on potential rents because of the too high a going bargaining power of workers, β.
Those foregone rents are, again, greater in the informal sector, thus, there is underinvestment into
the informal sector job creation.
However, even if the Hosios condition holds, i.e. β = η(θ), the equilibrium in our economy does
not represent a socially optimal allocation of jobs because of the diﬀerence in values of kf and ki. In
general, the presence of start-up costs that ﬁrms have to bear unilaterally before entering one sector
or another in fact implies that workers gain additional advantage in wage negotiations. Indeed,
while ﬁrms start wage bargains with some costs already borne, workers enter into negotiations
without incurring any costs previously. So, while ﬁrms, in the ﬁrst place, are concerned with
recouping the costs, workers are just interested in receiving as high a wage as possible. In such a
situation workers are able to capture excessive rents in the process of wage negotiations, so that
ﬁrms may underinvest in creation of jobs in the economy in general, and in one of the sectors in
particular. Obviously, it may well lead to ineﬃciency of the equilibrium. This result is closely
linked with the presence in our framework of a version of the so-called hold-up problem, already
mentioned above brieﬂy.
The hold-up problem: a source of ineﬃciency In relation to investments the hold-up prob-
lem arises when one party pays the cost while others share in the payoﬀ. The problem has attracted
attention in numerous studies, beginning from the earliest discussions (Williamson, 1975), ﬁrst for-
malisation (Grout, 1984), and coinage of the term (Williamson, 1985), to more recent investigation
into the causes and possible remedies (e.g. MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993; Malcomson, 1997). The
26Note, however, the proof of Proposition 1, Appendix A, shows that when kf = ki the stability properties of the
interior equilibrium may change - in fact it then coincides with the bifurcation point separating two regions with
diﬀerent phase dynamics of θ and φ.
44search-in-the-labour-market literature has addressed the problem both as regards ﬁrms (Acemoglu
and Shimer, 1999; Acemoglu, 2001) and workers (Acemoglu, 1996), who unilaterally invest into
either physical or human capital, respectively.
Grout (1984) has shown that the hold-up problem leads to ineﬃciency of investment arising
in the absence of binding contracts, when workers can negotiate wages and employment once the
ﬁrm has committed itself to a speciﬁc investment.27 Furthermore, as pointed out by Malcomson
(1997), in the presence of labour turnover costs there can be hold-up of general, as well as speciﬁc
investments. The underlying cause of hold-ups is incompleteness of contracts. If contracts were to
be complete all the parties who beneﬁt from an investment could be made to pay their share of the
cost. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) note that even when contracts are incomplete an appropriate
arrangement of relationship between agents can prevent the problem. However, in a situation when
investment must be sunk before agents meet contracts and related arrangements are impossible
because at the time they invest agents do not know who their trade partner is going to be (Acemoglu,
1996).
If investments made by ﬁrms are exogenous to the economy considered, the hold-up problem
does not necessarily lead to ineﬃciency under an appropriate choice of bargaining power of workers.
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) has shown that in, for example, a one sector search environment the
standard Hosios condition guarantees a socially optimal outcome. In that case workers still share
in returns, but their ability to appropriate rents does not have a negative externality eﬀect on the
decision of ﬁrms to invest. The only externality that must be internalised in such an economy
is the one of the number of vacancies on worker’s outside option in the bargaining process. In
other words, it is the externality of congestion that ﬁrms and workers cause to its peers. As we
have mentioned in Section 4.2.2, the Hosios condition achieves precisely that - it eliminates the
congestion externality. However, once the investments are made endogenous the Hosios condition
is no longer suﬃcient: even if it is possible to make the level of wages to be equal to the social
shadow value of labour, it is impossible to guarantee that both the level and the slope of the wage
function are equal to appropriate social values (Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999). With endogenous
investment there is a negative externality of worker’s bargaining power on ﬁrms’ investment, which
is not internalised even when the Hosios condition is met.
The hold-up problem in our model In our model ﬁrms sink non-speciﬁc investments, which
are treated as exogenous parameters. These costs, kf and ki, are incurred before meeting potential
employees. Given a non-competitive labour market and wage bargaining, the presence of search
frictions and, hence, switching costs (i.e. costs of ﬁnding a new trade partner) implies that workers
exert monopoly power in sharing the surplus of a match. During wage negotiations workers capture
part of the return on kf and ki as indicated by the equilibrium wage equations (23) and (24). Thus,
27MacLeod and Malcomson (1993, p.813) state that "in contrast to general investments, speciﬁc investments are
valuable for trade only with the chosen partner, not for trade with third parties".
45we are clearly dealing with the hold-up problem.
As investments kf and ki are non-speciﬁc and, importantly, exogenous, following Acemoglu
and Shimer (1999) we should not expect hold-ups to cause a problem for eﬃciency of equilibrium.
Indeed in the corner solution case in Section 4.2.2 the presence of start-up investments unilaterally
borne by ﬁr m sd o e sn o ta ﬀect optimality of the outcome. There is no externality of the worker’s
bargaining power on ﬁrms’ investment. At the same time, there is a standard congestion externality
which is internalised when the Hosios condition is met.
However, in the interior equilibrium the presence of the start-up costs will in general cause an
eﬃciency problem. To see that consider the expressions (23) and (24) re-written as













The terms on the left hand side represent average or expected wage mark-ups that workers are
paid on top of their outside option. It can be seen that as kf >k i the formal wage mark-up is
larger than its informal counterpart. Thus, intuitively, in equilibrium ceteris paribus ﬁrms will
underinvest into formal job creation (and, hence, in the economy as a whole) as in the formal
sector they on average forego more rents to workers than in the informal sector. Obviously, such a
situation implies that the interior equilibrium is not eﬃcient. Indeed, it can be veriﬁed that with
kf >k i in the interior equilibrium the value of being formally employed, Ef, is always higher than
the value of being informally employed, Ei, regardless of the value of β.T h u s ,ﬁrms do not take
into account that creating a formal rather than informal vacancy has a positive externality eﬀect
on workers. The Hosios condition cannot internalise this externality which works not through the
market tightness, θ, but through the proportion of formal vacancies, φ.28 Thus, with kf 6= ki the
Hosios condition is necessary but not suﬃcient for eﬃciency of the equilibrium with two sectors
even when the investments are exogenous.
If, however, kf = ki in equilibrium the expected wage mark-ups will be equal across the two
sectors, the value of formal employment for workers will be equal to the value of being informally
employed, Ef = Ei, and the creation of a formal rather than an informal vacancy will not have
any eﬀect on worker’s welfare. In fact workers will be indiﬀerent as to what proportion of formal
vacancies φ is achieved in equilibrium. Thus, the allocative externality will disappear and the
Hosios condition will again be suﬃcient to guarantee the eﬃciency of the interior equilibrium in
terms of maximisation of the private surplus (26).
28The reader can be referred to Acemoglu (2001) for a study of a similar uninternalised allocative externality in a
model of labour market segmentation.
46Summary Thus, under the assumptions we have made equilibria in our economy are not eﬃcient.
In the particular case of the interior equilibrium with both formal and informal jobs both the total
amount of jobs in the economy and their allocation across sectors are generally not optimal. Two
factors are responsible for this result. They are, ﬁrst, the relation between the bargaining power of
workers and the elasticity of the matching function, and, second, the relation between the costs of
entry that ﬁrms pay in the two sectors before meeting their employees.
From the results outlined above and detailed in the appendix it follows that the necessary and
suﬃcient condition for the interior equilibrium to be eﬃcient in our model is that both the Hosios
condition holds and kf = ki. If this is not the case, the eﬀects on job creation are as follows. If
β<η(θ) ﬁrms tend to overinvest in job creation in the informal sector because of the discrepancy
between the going bargaining power of workers and the one resulting from actual labour market
conditions. At the same time, as kf >k i ﬁrms tend to underinvest in formal job creation. Thus
both factors inﬂuencing the cross-sector allocation of jobs imply that the optimal proportion of
formal vacancies must be higher. Meanwhile, they imply that the impact on the total job creation
in the economy depends on the relative size of the two eﬀects. It turns out that the tendency
to overinvest in the informal sector is smaller than the the tendency to underinvest in the formal
sector, so on the whole there is too little job creation in the economy. By contrast, if β>η (θ),
ﬁrms tend to underinvest in the informal sector. At the same time they still have a tendency to
underinvest in the formal sector, as kf >k i. Thus, while the eﬀect on the total amount of job
creation in the economy is clear - again too little jobs are created, - the impact on the sectoral
allocation of jobs is, however, ambiguous. Depending on the size of the two eﬀects there can be
either too many or too few formal vacancies.
These results are important not only from the perspective of a better understanding of func-
tioning of economies with a particular formal-informal labour market segmentation. They also shed
light on the issue of equilibrium eﬃciency in two-sector search economies of a more general nature.
The previous theoretical literature has mainly studied only one sector economies in that regard,
while welfare implications in two-sector search models have largely not been analysed. The few
exceptions are Davidson et al. (1987) and Acemoglu (2001). In the former work authors suggest a
two-sector model with one search and one competitive sectors. They show that in such a framework
ﬁrms underinvest in the search sector. In this respect our model goes one step further by consid-
ering two search sectors instead of one. In the second study Acemoglu (2001) stresses the role of
capital investment hold-ups in creating allocative ineﬃciencies. However, he does not say anything
about the role of the relation between the bargaining power of workers and the elasticity of the
matching function in misallocation of jobs across the sectors. In this regard our model contributes
by pointing to the fact that both the Hosios condition and the absence of asymmetries in investment
hold-ups across sectors are important for eﬃciency of the steady state equilibrium with two jobs,
both from the point of view of the total amount of job creation and the distribution of jobs across
47sectors. Interestingly, here we do not talk about hold-ups of capital investments, but rather of the
costs associated with the extortionary activities of the government.
The interior equilibrium in our model is never eﬃcient because kf >k i. Exactly this factor
makes for the total amount of job creation in the economy being below optimal. This sends a clear
message for economic policy that we shall discuss in the next section.
4.2.4 Achieving optimal and sub-optimal allocations
Having established the conditions that make for ﬁrst-best outcomes in our economy we can now
turn to considering eﬃciency grounds for the reduction in the size of the informal sector.
The ﬁrst implication we can derive from the above is that in the interior equilibrium the spectre
of ineﬃciency is raised as compared to a corner equilibrium. This, as we have seen, is explained by
the possibility of an additional allocative ineﬃciency, that can be caused either by asymmetries in
opportunities for hold-up of start-up investments across sectors or by the violation of the Hosios
eﬃciency condition, or both. Thus, on these grounds for a benevolent government aiming to attain
a ﬁrst-best allocation of jobs in the economy it can be reasonable to accept such a set of policies
that would drive the economy to a corner equilibrium with formal jobs only. In that case, the scope
for ineﬃciency of the resulting steady state outcome is narrowed and depends solely on whether or
not the Hosios eﬃciency condition is violated.
Alternatively, the benevolent government can in the ﬁrst place directly address a source of
ineﬃciency, rather than be concerned with the type of equilibrium resulting in the long term.
Indeed, imagine a situation when the economy starts out in the interior equilibrium, while the
attainment of the corner equilibrium with formal jobs alone implies, for example, a non-realistic
decrease in the tax rate (recall its eﬀect on the long-run outcome as explained in Section 4.1). We
have seen that the eﬃciency properties of equilibrium essentially depend on the state of the labour
market in general, but not on whether or not the informal sector is present in the steady state
eventually. Thus, the question is whether or not governments can create suitable labour market
conditions that would make ﬁrst-best outcomes more probable.
Fighting corruption While there is no guarantee that the Hosios condition will hold in reality
(see, e.g., Stevens, 2004), the obvious area where actions of the governments can make a signiﬁcant
contribution to reducing the scope for ineﬃciency is elimination or mitigation of hold-up oppor-
tunities. As follows from the previous section the interior equilibrium is never eﬃcient because of
the diﬀerences in values of start-up costs kf and ki that lead to misallocation of jobs and workers.
Thus, reducing the diﬀerence between kf and ki would decrease the scope for allocative failures. In
the context of our model, the greater value of formal sector entry costs, kf,i nr e l a t i o nt oi n f o r m a l
sector costs, ki, is caused by malversation at the low level of government, i.e. by the so-called
administrative corruption. Thus, a pursuit of structural administrative reforms aimed at curbing
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bribery and low-level corruption should level oﬀ hold-up opportunities across sectors and, hence,
leave less room for ineﬃciencies in allocation. Importantly, as follows from Section 4.1, a reduction
in kf increases the probability of ending up in an equilibrium without the informal sector too.
However, notice that from the current perspective on the issue of why kf should be reduced, a pos-
sibility of elimination of the informal sector in the long run accompanies but not causes an increase
in economic welfare. Speaking diﬀerently, other policies, apart from those aﬀecting kf, that may
result in a decrease in size or complete eradication of the informal sector, may not necessarily bring
about an improvement in welfare. We shall shortly illustrate this argument more convincingly.
It should be noted, however, that in practice ﬁghting bribery is likely to demand a great deal
of resources and be time-consuming. Some studies of corruption (e.g. Wei, 1999) suggest that its
various forms are highly correlated, so that the presence of corruption at the low level of government
may well be an indication of a "grabbing hand" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) government as a whole.
Politicians themselves may enact extortionary taxation laws, mismanage state budget, and so forth,
in order to create abilities to extract rents. De Soto (1989) notes that many permits, licenses and
regulations exist probably to give venal oﬃcials the power to deny them and to collect bribes in
return for providing the permits. Thus, interaction between diﬀerent levels of the public oﬃce is
likely to imply that it will balk at the prospect of structural reforms.
Reduction in informality and eﬃciency Attainment of the corner equilibrium with formal
jobs alone or ﬁghting corruption make ﬁrst-best outcomes more likely in our economy. However,
the complete eradication of the informal sector on the eﬃciency grounds or the elimination of
preconditions conducive to allocative ineﬃciency may well be unrealistic tasks because of their
immensity. Let us consider now a more modest objective of improving on the current allocation
of jobs if the economy starts out in the interior equilibrium. The matter of interest is what the
benevolent government can do as to achieve at least some sub-optimal level of welfare if ﬁrst-best
solutions are not probable. In other words, should the government try to increase or decrease the
size of the informal sector given that initially both types of job exist in steady state?
The policy parameters that aﬀect the size of the informal sector in the interior equilibrium are


















Figure 8: The eﬀect of a rise in m or F
50the level of entry costs in the formal sector, kf. Consider, for example, an increase in the tax rate.
Intuitively, recalling the analysis in Section 4.1, such a change should shift the equilibrium allocation
of jobs to the left of the initial equilibrium position, so that the economy gets nearer to the purely
informal equilibrium (Fig.7). If, however, the tax rate is cut down, the economy is to move to the
right, so that the equilibrium with formal jobs alone gets closer. Assuming that all other parameters
are held ﬁxed, table 1, Fig.7 and 8, and Appendix A illustrate in somewhat greater detail the eﬀects
of such changes in taxes, unemployment beneﬁts, the ﬁne rate, monitoring eﬃciency, and the level
of entry costs in the formal sector on the equilibrium level of market tightness, θ, the proportion
of formal vacancies, φ, the numbers of unemployed, U,f o r m a l l y ,N,a n di n f o r m a l l y ,I,e m p l o y e d . 29
Consider now the question of whether or not a decrease in the share of informal jobs prompted,
for example, by a higher F (Fig.8), leads to a higher level of welfare. The impact depends on
how large is the eﬀect of policies on θ relative to the eﬀect on φ. Recall that N, U,a n dI are
functions of θ and φ, so substituting for them in (26) and using the implicit function theorem gives
a relationship between θ and φ, drawn as a dashed line in Fig.9, along which the private surplus is
constant. An analysis of this relationship at the equilibrium point suggests that shifts of this curve
towards northeast bring about a higher surplus. However, this curve can be ﬂatter (the dashed line
PS1 in Fig.9), steeper (PS2) than both the locus of formal jobs (18) and the locus of informal jobs
(19), or it can be ﬂatter than one locus but steeper than the other one. Depending on which case
occurs, welfare implications of implementing the same policy can be very diﬀerent. For example,
when the private surplus in equilibrium is given by the line PS1 in Fig.9, an increase in F would
decrease the level of welfare (compare Fig.8 and 9). By contrast, if the private surplus is represented
by the line PS2, the same policy unambiguously improves on eﬃciency of the equilibrium. As it
is shown in the appendix the slope of the private surplus curve in the (θ,φ)-plane depends on the
relative values of kf and ki, and the value of the bargaining power of workers, β.I np a r t i c u l a r :
Remark 2 The higher is kf as compared to ki, and/or the lower is β as compared to the elasticity
o ft h em a t c h i n gf u n c t i o n ,η(θ), the steeper is the curve PS in Fig.9. In other words, it is more
likely that this curve will cut both loci (18) and (19) from above in the (θ,φ)-plane, so that the
policies aimed at the eradication of the informal sector are more likely to improve on the economic
welfare measured by the size of the private surplus.
This remark suggests that when the level of corruption in the economy is high (which reﬂects
in higher kf), and/or when the bargaining power of ﬁrms vis-à-vis workers is strong (lower β), it
makes sense to try to reduce the share of the informal sector. Indeed, as follows from the results
in Section 4.2.3, both higher kf and lower β exacerbate underinvestment in creation of formal jobs
29While the upshot of such policies is generally in line with results obtained in many other studies of formal-informal
segmentation, our model, however, indicates that a reduction in the level of unemployment beneﬁts would increase the
proportion of formal vacancies and decrease unemployment, while keeping the equilibrium level of market tightness
constant. See Section A.3.3 in the appendix for a comparison of this ﬁnding to the results obtained in some other





















Figure 9: Private surplus and interior equilibrium
and overinvestment in creation of informal jobs, respectively. On the one hand, ﬁrms avoid the
formal sector where they have to give up more rents to the workers during wage bargains; on the
other hand, they aim to make the most of their stronger bargaining position in the informal sector,
other things being equal. Thus, under these conditions the allocative failure to distribute jobs
properly towards the formal sector is more acute, so that policies, making investments in creation
of informal workplaces less attractive, would be more likely to increase the level of economic welfare.
By contrast, if the diﬀerence between kf and ki is negligible, whereas β is signiﬁcantly greater than
η(θ) a reduction in size of informality prompted by a change in τ, F, etc., is more likely to be
detrimental for economic welfare.
Obviously, a precise set of policies pursued by the government will depend on the ﬁscal stance
and other restrictions.30 By applying the same approach as we did above to the private surplus, it
is possible to show that the budget revenue
R(θ,φ)=Nτ + ImF − Ubu (35)
can also be represented as a negatively-sloped line in the (θ,φ)-plane. Its slope will be the larger
in absolute value the larger is the tax rate τ in comparison with the expected value of the ﬁne in
the underground sector, mF. Thus,
Remark 3 The higher is τ as compared to mF the more likely policies reducing the proportion of
30So, for example, a type of the government obviously aﬀects policies it opts for. A "benevolent dictator" (as
discussed in Buchanan, 1975) is likely to act diﬀerently from a "grabbing hand" government (as in Shleifer and
Vishny, 1998). Also, political objectives may and often do diﬀer depending on the part of the Laﬀer curve that the
economy currently sits on (if, for instance, revenue maximisation is assumed). Buchanan and Lee (1982) illustrate
this by drawing destinctions between short run and long run Laﬀer curves.
52informal vacancies are to result in the higher budget revenue.
It should be clear that such policies can lead to an increase in both the budget revenue (35)
and the private surplus (26), so that the total gain of both the private agents and the government
rises. The result will depend on the relative slopes of the budget revenue level curve and the PS
curve in the (θ,φ)-plane.
4.2.5 Summary
In this section we have generally addressed the issue of what governments should do to improve on
the eﬃciency of equilibrium allocation of jobs and workers across the formal and informal sectors.
We have split the analysis in two steps.
Firstly, we have shown that ineﬃciency of equilibria is inherent in our model. Any steady
state is not optimal due to congestion externalities of a standard type. In order to internalise such
externalities, the so-called Hosios eﬃciency condition (Hosios, 1990), equating the bargaining power
of workers and the elasticity of the matching function, must hold. However, if the economy ends up
in a steady state with both formal and informal sectors, such a long-run equilibrium suﬀers from an
additional market failure caused by the so-called hold-up problem (Grout, 1984; Williamson, 1985).
The preconditions for hold-ups in our model are exacerbated by the lower tier of the government -
corrupt bureaucracy - that extorts rents from ﬁrms entering the formal market. In this situation
the Hosios condition is no longer enough to guarantee the attainment of ﬁrst-best optimum, as
it can never internalise the allocative ineﬃciency. In turn, because of that ﬁrms underinvest in
creation of formal vacancies, while workers gain higher rents in the formal economy during wage
bargaining. Importantly, the ineﬃciency of equilibria that we have considered here is not provoked
by a particular size of the informal economy, but rather by particular conditions in the labour
market. Thus, in order to make ﬁrst-best outcomes more probable the government has to address
causes of ineﬃciencies but not try to scale down the informal sector in the ﬁrst place. Still, reduction
in the size of the latter can come about as a by-product of particular eﬃciency-improving policies.
As a second exercise we have looked into the ability of the government to attain sub-optimal
levels of welfare if the economy starts out in the interior equilibrium. We have especially been
interested whether a reduction in informality in such a situation can be eﬃciency improving. It
turned out that welfare eﬀect of such policies as changes in the tax rate, ﬁnes for running businesses
informally, unemployment beneﬁts, or monitoring eﬃciency, depends on the same factors which lead
to ineﬃciency of the equilibrium. In particular, the stronger is the position of ﬁrms vis-à-vis workers
in wage bargains, and/or the better are the opportunities for hold-up in the formal sector, the more
acute is underinvestment in formal job creation. So, the more likely is the reduction in the share of
informal vacancies to bring about an improvement in economic welfare. Thus, the main conclusion
that can be drawn from this discussion is that conditions in the labour market do aﬀect welfare
implications of policies. An important result is that the relation between the bargaining power of
53workers and the elasticity of the matching function must be taken into account before deciding on
reducing the scope of informality. However, the previous literature (Kolm and Larsen, 2001; Bouev,
2002; and Fugazza and Jacques, 2004), that incorporates the search-in-the-labour-market approach
to the modelling of the formal-informal segmentation and that assesses welfare implications of
various policies, has completely overlooked the considerations outlined here.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this work we have broadly pursued two main objectives.
First, it has been shown that labour market institutions, such as wage bargaining may be a
very important channel through which state regulations lead to stable emergence of informality in
the long run. Labour costs are widely held to be one of the main culprits of causing a ﬁrms’ drive
of moving businesses underground, however, the issue of wage negotiations have not as yet been
addressed in this respect.
The model presented in this essay suggests that general conditions for the emergence of long-
term mixed equilibria with formal and informal sectors imply that the two negotiating sides, i.e.
ﬁrms and workers, have to prefer diﬀerent sectors if given full power to appropriate the whole surplus
of a productive match. Such a diﬀerence in preferences may be possible due to diﬀerences in both
sector surpluses and the outside options of ﬁrms and workers. The former are caused by standard
government regulations, such as taxation, penalties for involvement into irregular activities, etc.
The latter are linked with both the impact of the government’s auditing activities whereby they
destroy informal matches and cause asymmetries in match lifetimes across the two sectors, and the
venal practices of the state bureaucracy extorting bribes and erecting artiﬁcial barriers to entry.
Costly time-consuming search for trade partners acts as a catalyst of the eﬀects of government
audit and bureaucratic extortion, as it rases opportunity costs of idleness of sunk investments and
leads to rent sharing.
The role of wage bargaining and rent sharing in the emergence of equilibria with the informal
sector has important implications for policy-makers - a second major issue analysed in this essay.
We have illustrated many implications by considering such a standard policy tool as the tax rate. It
has been found that, in general, higher tax rates raise the probability of an equilibrium with informal
jobs alone. However, the precise eﬀect (i.e. the type of equilibrium that the economy eventually
attains) of choosing a particular tax rate depends on relative values of reservation options of formal
and informal ﬁrms in their wage bargaining with workers. More speciﬁcally, other things being equal
governments can aﬀord setting higher tax rates and still achieve a long-run equilibrium without
informality whenever formal ﬁrms enjoy a stronger position in wage bargains with job-seekers than
their informal counterparts do. This signiﬁcance of ﬁrms’ reservation options in bargaining for the
eﬀect of policies is an important implication for policy making that has hardly been given any
attention in the previous literature on the topic. As we have seen, governments can aﬀect these
54outside options of ﬁrms in both formal and informal parts of the economy, and thus predetermine
the eﬀect that a change in the tax rate will have on the long-term outcome. Such an impact on the
reservation options can be achieved either through policies aimed at reducing the scope for bribing
in the formal sector or through policies raising eﬃciency of monitoring of informal jobs.
Another issue of major importance for consideration of potential policies is the welfare impact
of various actions of the government, in particular those aimed at reducing the size of informality.
In analysing this impact we have ascertained that ﬁrst-best outcomes are generally not guaranteed
in our model. It has been shown that ineﬃciency of equilibria is caused by general labour market
conditions and not linked to the presence or a particular size of the informal sector as such in
the steady state. The ineﬃciency is brought about through rent sharing and inter alia related to
the presence of the so-called hold-up problem in our set-up. This problem arises when workers
have enough bargaining power to share in payoﬀs on investments unilaterally made by ﬁrms before
these meet with their potential employees. The novelty of this work is that it shows that hold-ups
can eﬀectively emerge not only in the presence of investments in capital, but in the presence of
expenses that ﬁrms have to pay at the stage of entry to suborn venal oﬃcials. In our economy
hold-ups cause allocative ineﬃciencies, i.e. misallocation of jobs and workers across the formal and
informal sectors when they both exist in equilibrium. Thus, we suggest that ﬁghting corruption
is more important than reducing the size of the informal sector in the ﬁrst place - the reduction,
however, can come about as a by-product of policies aimed at administrative reforms and preventing
bribing practices. This supplements other theoretical work (see, e.g., Murphy et al., 1993; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1998; Sarte, 2000; etc.) that also indicates that reduction in corruption brings more
entrepreneurs into the formal sector. Here we have especially highlighted the eﬃciency-improving
aspect of such policies.
It is also interesting that while in general governmental actions scaling down informality can
lead the economy to a better, though not a ﬁrst-best outcome, it is not necessarily always the
case. We have shown that conditions in the labour market must be taken into account when
evaluating the eﬀect of such policies. In particular, it has been found that the relation between the
bargaining power of workers and the elasticity of the matching function, as well as diﬀerences in
hold-up opportunities across sectors bear on welfare implications of identical sets of policies. If, for
example, the bargaining power of workers is relatively low (less than the elasticity of the matching
function), while the level of corruption in the economy is high (which is reﬂected in the relative
values of start-up costs in the formal and informal sectors), then it is more likely for the policies
cutting down the size of the informal sector to result in a higher level of economic welfare. This is
explained by the fact that the stronger the ﬁrms are vis-à-vis workers in wage bargaining, and the
more onerous bribing is, the stronger the ﬁrms’ drive is to open informal rather than formal jobs.
Thus, they overinvest in job creation in the informal economy and cause greater misallocation,
which should be corrected through a reduction in size of the shadow sector. Interestingly, in many
55states, successors of the former Soviet Union the bargaining power of workers in wage negotiations
with ﬁrms is believed to be negligible. Although there is evidence on rent appropriation by workers
(Shakhnovich and Yudashkina, 2001), employees often have nearly no vote and are bound to accept
the conditions of their employer. In such a situation our model does suggest that policies reducing
the share of the shadow economy are likely to somewhat increase the private sector surplus.
To conclude we note that this work has also provided some useful hints on directions of future
research. In particular, although not discussed at length in the main text, it has been found that
higher unemployment beneﬁts in the model with formal and informal sectors and wage bargaining
m a yl e a dt oa ni n c r e a s ei ns i z eo ft h ei n f o r m a ls e c t o r-as u r p r i s i n gr e s u l ta tﬁrst sight, which,
however, concurs well with some evidence from Eastern Europe. We believe that analysis of the
eﬀects of unemployment compensation on economic welfare, government revenue, formal and in-
formal employment within the framework put forward in this essay deserves further attention and
should form the basis for investigation in the future.
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62A Proofs, Main Technical Results, and Further Analysis
A.1 Some Core Elements of the Model
This section of the appendix presents some core technical results that are referred to in the main
text.
A.1.1 Bellman functions for workers
The system of Bellman equations for ﬁlled jobs and vacancies (1)-(3), for workers (5)-(7), the wage
determination rules (8) and (9), and the zero proﬁt conditions (10) and (11) imply:
rEf =
(rβ(ρSf + β (1 − φ)α(θ)(Sf − Si)) + πρbu + βα(θ)(ρφSf + π(1 − φ)Si))
πρ+ α(θ)β ((1 − φ)π + φρ)
,
rEi =
(rβ(πSi − βφα(θ)(Sf − Si)) + πρbu + βα(θ)(ρφSf + π (1 − φ)Si))
πρ+ α(θ)β ((1 − φ)π + φρ)
,
rEu =
πρbu + βα(θ)(ρφSf + π(1 − φ)Si)
πρ+ α(θ)β ((1 − φ)π + φρ)
.
For the analysis in the main text we are interested in properties of function Eu (θ,φ,·). It is
easy to verify that
∂Eu(θ,φ)







φρSf +( 1− φ)πSi
r(πρ+ α(θ)β ((1 − φ)π + φρ))
2 > 0,
as Sf > 0 and Si > 0 by assumption. At the same time, the sign of
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ depends on the relative





r(πρ+ α(θ)β ((1 − φ)π + φρ))
= α(θ)βπρ
(ρSf − πSi)+α(θ)β (Sf − Si)
r(πρ+ α(θ)β ((1 − φ)π + φρ))
2.
Consequently,
a) if Sf − Si > 0 then
Sf
π > Si
ρ and Ef >E i, and hence
∂Eu(θ,φ)




ρ then Sf − Si < 0 and Ef <E i, and hence
∂Eu(θ,φ)




ρ and Sf − Si < 0 then Ef <E i when θ →∞ , and Ef >E i when θ → 0, so that
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ < 0 when θ →∞ ,a n d
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ > 0 when θ → 0 (region 2, Fig.1).
Propositions 1 and 2 pay more attention to the case c) above.
63A.1.2 Functions Πf(θ,φ) and Πi(θ,φ)
The possibility of an interior equilibrium with both formal and informal jobs depends on charac-
teristics of the two curves in the (θ,φ)-plane, namely the loci of formal (18) and informal (19) jobs.























The function Eu (θ,φ) is given in (20). Its properties imply that it belongs to the interval between
bu
r and 1
r min(Sf + bu,S i + bu), with
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂θ > 0 whenever Sf > 0 and Si > 0. The behaviour of
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ has been brieﬂya n a l y s e da b o v e .
Πf(θ,φ)=0is equivalent to y − τ − πkf − rEu (θ,φ)=
rπkf
(1−β)q(θ). Then from the formal sector












∂θ > 0 and
∂q(θ)
∂θ < 0 we unambiguously have
∂Πf(θ,φ)
∂θ |Πf(θ,φ)=0 < 0.
By analogy, the derivative with respect to φ is:
∂Πf(θ,φ)
∂φ





The sign of this partial derivative is opposite to the sign of
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ .
In a similar vein, the informal sector zero proﬁt condition is Πi(θ,φ)=0 , which is equivalent












Again we unambiguously have
∂Πi(θ,φ)
∂θ |I(θ,φ)=0 < 0, while the partial derivative with respect to φ










These results are used in Section 3.6.3 of the main text for determining the relative slopes and
64positions of the two loci (18) and (19) in the (θ,φ)-plane (see Fig.2-5).
A.1.3 Stocks and proportions
In Section 4 of the main text in the formula for the private surplus (26) we use expressions for
the stocks of workers in steady state. From Bellman equations (5)-(7), stocks at steady state must
satisfy:
δN = α(θ)φU,
(δ + m)I = α(θ)(1 − φ)U,
α(θ)U = δN +( δ + m)I,
1=I + N + U.
The solution to this system is
U =
δ (δ + m)








δ(δ + m)+α(θ)(δ + φm)
.
Thus, it is straightforward to see that the proportion of ﬁlled formal jobs in the total number




























All these results are useful for the analysis of dynamic maximisation problems (see below).
A.2 Proof of Propositions and Analysis of the Bifurcation Point
The variant of the model considered in the main text assumes that kf >k i. This assumption bears
on the conditions, under which an interior equilibrium with formal and informal jobs exists and is
stable. Here we provide proofs of the two propositions from the main text that help explain the
65behaviour of
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ , and hence the two loci (18) and (19) as can be seen from (21) and (22). Then
we consider possible abolition of the assumption kf >k i, and then consequences of such a change.
A.2.1 Proposition 1
Proposition 1. There exists some threshold value of the market tightness θ, deﬁned by parameters
kf,k i,β ,r ,δ ,b u,τ,m ,F ,and parameters of the matching function, such that for parameter values
satisfying conditions in region 2, Fig.1, and for any θ>θ the derivative
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ is negative, and






∂θ > 0 (see above).
The restrictions on parameter values in region 2, Fig.1, imply
Sf
π > Si
ρ and Sf −Si < 0, so that
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ < 0 when θ →∞ , and
∂Eu(θ,φ)




r(πρ+α(θ)β((1−φ)π+φρ))2 , we have:
a)
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ > 0 if ρSf − πSi > −α(θ)β (Sf − Si);
b)
∂Eu(θ,φ)









∂φ < 0 if α(θ) > −
ρSf−πSi
β(Sf−Si).






. The argument in the parentheses is positive, hence from
properties of function α(θ) it follows that θ always exists, and
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂φ > 0 if θ<θ,w h i l e
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂φ < 0 if θ>θ.
Q.E.D.
The following proposition establishes that under the condition kf >k i, the point of interior
equilibrium falls into the region where
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂φ > 0, i.e. the value of being unemployed rises as
the proportion of formal vacancies increases.
A.2.2 Proposition 2
Proposition 2. Let θ be a threshold value of market tightness such that
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ =0 , and let
(θ∗,φ ∗) be a point of an interior equilibrium in region 2, Fig.6. Then given kf >k i and ρ>π ,θ ∗
is always less than θ.
Proof:
















(1 − β)(Si + bu − rEu(θ∗,φ ∗))
.
Then equating the two ratios on the right hand side, and solving for Eu (θ∗,φ ∗) we get
Eu(θ∗,φ ∗)=
πkf (y − mF) − ρki (y − τ)
r(πkf − ρki)
.
Substituting in turn the expression for Eu(θ∗,φ ∗) from (20) and solving for α(θ∗) yields
α(θ∗)=
ρkiSf − πkfSi
β (Si − Sf)(kfφ∗ + ki (1 − φ∗))
> 0.









>α(θ∗), which implies θ>θ ∗ given the properties of α(·).
Q.E.D.
A.2.3 Bifurcation point
The value θ is in fact a bifurcation point, i.e. the value of market tightness that separates two
regions with qualitatively diﬀerent dynamics. In particular, as follows from Proposition 1, for any
θ>θ the derivative
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ < 0. Hence, in region 2, Fig.6, the loci (18) and (19) are positively
sloped in the (θ,φ)-plane. So, if they intersect, the locus of formal jobs, being steeper in the
neighbourhood of the interior equilibrium point, must cross the locus of informal jobs from below.
Then, in that particular case, the interior equilibrium is not stable. By contrast, if θ<θ the
derivative
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ > 0, and the two loci are negatively sloped, the locus of formal jobs crosses the
locus of informal jobs from above, so that the resulting interior equilibrium is stable.
Proposition 2 ascertains that given kf >k i and ρ>πthe interior equilibrium in our model is
stable when it is unique, and this situation is depicted in Fig.4. What if conditions kf >k i and
ρ>πare violated?
If kf <k i or kf = ki then, given ρ>π ,it is easy to show that the interior equilibrium in region
2, Fig.6, satisﬁes θ∗ > θ or θ∗ = θ, respectively. In other words, in the former case it falls in the
region making for a non-stable interior equilibrium (where both loci (18) and (19) are positively
sloped - see above). In the latter case, it falls right in the border of regions with diﬀerent phase
dynamics, i.e. it coincides with the bifurcation point. In such a situation it is impossible to make
an unambiguous judgement on what the stability properties of the interior equilibrium will be.
Loayza (1996) notes that along with low labour costs, informal ﬁrms are also notable for facing
67high costs of capital. Thus, if one interprets start-up expenditure as costs of capital the case for
kf <k i can in principle be made. For such a modiﬁcation of our model, it would imply that no
stable long-run equilibrium with both formal and informal jobs is possible: while in region 2, Fig.6,
the equilibrium is not stable as explained above, region 4 ceases to exist altogether. Still, however,
generally it is held that total costs of access to legality are higher than costs of entry in informality.
Thus we do believe that the assumption kf >k i is very sensible, so that a stable long-run mixed
equilibrium is possible.
Finally, assuming ρ<πis not realistic. It has been mentioned in the main text that evidence
suggests that labour turnover is higher in the informal sector, which, thus, runs counter to such an
assumption.
A.3 Welfare and Policy Making
In this part of the appendix we derive the expression for the steady state private surplus, solve
the dynamic optimisation problems, and show that in general the equilibria in our model are not
eﬃcient.
A.3.1 Derivation of steady state surplus
In derivation of the private welfare function we follow Hosios (1990) and Pissarides (2000). In
the absence of capital costs, the total private surplus in steady state can be given by the ﬂow of
aggregate utility equal to the sum of the steady state utilities as follows:
Ξ(θ,φ)=NrEf + NrJf + IrEi + IrJi + θU (φrVf +( 1− φ)rVf)+UrEu,
where N = φ δ+m
δ+φm (1 − U) and I =( 1− φ) δ
δ+φm (1 − U) are the number of formal and informal
ﬁlled jobs, respectively, in steady state. θU gives the total number of vacancies in steady state,




As it is assumed that ﬁrms spend some resources, kf or ki, before opening a vacancy, the correct
expression for the total private surplus in our model must include the upfront expenditures (i.e.
must take into account the total size of the market):
Ξ(θ,φ)=NrEf+N (rJf − rkf)+IrEi+I (rJi − rki)+θU (φ(rVf − rkf)+( 1− φ)(rVi − rki))+UrEu.
One can simplify this expression by substituting for Jf,J i,V f,V i,E f,E i, and Eu, from (1)-(7),
and by evaluating it in the steady state equilibrium where Vf = kf and Vi = ki as follows from the
68t w oz e r op r o ﬁt conditions (10) and (11). It is important, however, that we never make use of the
wage bargaining equations (8) and (9), thus, ignoring the speciﬁc way wages share the surplus of a
match. In the end simple algebra yields:
Ξ(θ,φ)=N (y − τ − πkf)+I (y − mF − ρki) − θU (φrkf +( 1− φ)rki)+Ubu.
Thus, the steady state welfare is equal to the ﬂow product minus ﬂow costs of functioning
multiplied by the number of ﬁrms in each sector, as appropriate, less ﬂow costs of maintaining
vacancies in each sector, plus the ﬂow beneﬁt of being unemployed.
A.3.2 Solutions to dynamic maximisation problems
In order to illustrate some underlying problems with eﬃcient allocation of resources in wage bar-
gaining equilibrium, consider ﬁrst the maximisation programme when the economy ends up in the
corner equilibrium such as the one in Fig.2.







e−rt(N (y − τ − πkf) − θUkfr + Ubu)dt
subject to
·
N = α(θ)φU − δN,
·
U = δN − α(θ)U,
1=N + U.
Let µ be a co-state variable. Then the Hamiltonian is
H = e−rt((1 − U)(y − τ − πkf) − θUkfr + Ubu)+µ(δ (1 − U) − α(θ)U),
and the current value Hamiltonian is
H =( ( 1− U)(y − τ − πkf) − θUkfr + Ubu)+ertµ(δ (1 − U) − α(θ)U).





U,and the following Euler conditions: ∂H
∂θ =0 ;∂H
∂χ = U0; ∂H
∂U = rχ−χ0, where χ = ertµ.
Then in steady state
69∂H
∂θ
= −Ukfr − α0(θ)χU =0 ,
∂H
∂χ
= δ (1 − U) − α(θ)U =0 ,
∂H
∂U
= −(y − τ − πkf) − θkfr + bu − χ(δ + α(θ)) = rχ− χ0.
By solving this we get χ =
−kfr
α0(θ), so that χ0 =0and
Sf = rkf
µ




The last expression is formula (29) given in the main text, which the eﬃcient allocation must





In other words, the wage bargaining equilibrium satisfying the expression above, also given by (30)
in the main text, coincides with the eﬃcient allocation (29) only if α0 (θ)=( 1− β)q(θ), which is
the standard result in the matching function literature (see Hosios, 1990). If this eﬃciency condition
does not hold, the wage bargaining equilibrium is not eﬃcient.
Interior equilibrium case In the case of the interior equilibrium there is even more scope for







e−rt(N (y − τ − πkf)+I (y − mF − ρki) − θU (φkfr +( 1− φ)kir)+Ubu)dt
subject to
·
N = α(θ)φU − δN,
·
I = α(θ)(1− φ)U − (δ + m)I,
·
U = δN +( δ + m)I − α(θ)U,
1=N + I + U.
Let µ and γ be co-state variables, so that the Hamiltonian is
70H = e−rt(N (y − τ − πkf)+( 1− N − U)(y − mF − ρki) − θU (φkfr +( 1− φ)kir)+Ubu)
+µ(δN +( δ + m)(1− U − N) − α(θ)U)+γ (α(θ)φU − δN),
Then the current value Hamiltonian is
H =( N (y − τ − πkf)+( 1− N − U)(y − mF − ρki) − θU (φkfr +( 1− φ)kir)+Ubu)
+ertµ(δN +( δ + m)(1− U − N) − α(θ)U)+ertγ (α(θ)φU − δN).







I, and the following Euler conditions (see Kamien and Schwartz, 2001,
p.144): ∂H
∂θ =0 , ∂H
∂φ =0 , ∂H
∂µ = U0, ∂H
∂γ = N0, ∂H
∂U = −µ0, ∂H
∂N = −γ0. Or, alternatively, for the
current value Hamiltonian we must have: ∂H
∂θ =0 , ∂H
∂φ =0 , ∂H
∂χ = U0, ∂H
∂ψ = N0, ∂H
∂U = rχ − χ0,
∂H




= −U (φkfr +( 1− φ)kir) − α0 (θ)χU + α0 (θ)ψφU =0 ,
∂H
∂φ
= −θU (kfr − kir)+ψα(θ)U =0 ,
∂H
∂χ
= U0 = δN +( δ + m)(1− U − N) − α(θ)U =0 ,
∂H
∂ψ
= N0 = α(θ)φU − δN =0 ,
∂H
∂U
= −(y − mF − ρki − bu) − θ(φkfr +( 1− φ)kir) − (δ + m + α(θ))χ + ψα(θ)φ = rχ− χ0,
∂H
∂N
=( y − τ − πkf) − (y − mF − ρki) − mχ − δψ = rψ − ψ0.


















so that ψ0 =0and χ0 =0 .
Thus, at the point of optimum we must have






(φkf +( 1− φ)ki)
α0 (θ)
¶
(ρ + α(θ)) = 0,













which are obtained from ∂H
∂U = rχ− χ0 and ∂H
∂N = rψ − ψ0, respectively. The two equations above




















Remark on the existence of solutions In general the existence of (interior) eﬃcient so-
lutions depends on further assumptions about the matching function, in particular the second
derivatives of α(θ) and q(θ). If interior solutions do not exist, then only one of the two equations
above can be satisﬁed at any moment in time. So that either the total number of jobs or the
allocation across the sectors is not eﬃcient. However, assuming that solutions to the maximisation
problem do exist, we can explore if the equilibrium allocation under wage bargaining belongs to the
set of such solutions. From Kamien and Schwartz (2001) we know that the Pontryagin maximum
principle provides the necessary conditions for optimality. They become suﬃcient if, for example,
the maximised Hamiltonian satisﬁes the condition of Arrow’s generalised version of Mangasarian’s
theorem (ibid, pp.221-222). However, even if the ﬁrst-order Euler conditions are not suﬃcient, they
are still useful in recognising ineﬃcient allocations (as in, e.g., Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999).
Implications for the wage bargaining equilibrium In order to evaluate eﬃciency prop-
erties of the wage bargaining equilibrium in region 2, Fig.6, one needs to work out the signs of the
two partial derivatives ∂H
∂θ and ∂H
∂φ in the interior equilibrium. In the case of optimal allocation the
two derivatives must be equal to zero.
(a) Consider ﬁrst the derivative ∂H
∂θ .
From (36) we know that ψ0 = χ0 =0 . Then, ∂H
∂U = rχ and ∂H
∂N = rψ. These two equations can






















In the interior equilibrium (by recalling the deﬁnition of Sf and Si, and substituting for them
from (18)-(19) and using (20)) this expression becomes:
∂H
∂θ |equil. = U
r((α0(θ)−(1−β)q(θ))(φkf+(1−φ)ki)π(ρ+α(θ))+α0(θ)βα(θ)φ(π+φm)(kf−ki))
π(ρ+α(θ))(1−β)q(θ) .
The sign of this derivative depends on the two relations between α0 (θ) and (1 − β)q(θ), and kf
and ki. As kf >k i, it is easy to see that ∂H
∂θ |equil. is unambiguously positive if α0 (θ) > (1 − β)q(θ).
In that situation the total amount of jobs created in the economy is ineﬃciently low in the interior
wage bargaining equilibrium. If, however, α0 (θ) < (1 − β)q(θ) the sign of the derivative may be
ambiguous.
Note, the condition α0 (θ) < (1 − β)q(θ) is equivalent to β<
α(θ)−α0(θ)θ
α(θ) = −q0 (θ) θ
q(θ) = η(θ),
where η(θ) is the elasticity of the matching function in the notation introduced in, e.g., Pissarides
(2000).
(b) Consider now the derivative ∂H
∂φ.
Applying the same approach as to the analysis of ∂H





















As kf >k i we have that the derivative ∂H
∂φ|equil. is always positive if α0 (θ) < (1 − β)q(θ) or
β<η(θ), for that matter. In that case an increase in the proportion of formal vacancies among
all vacancies will increase the value of the Hamiltonian and, hence, welfare. If, however, β<η(θ)
the sign of the derivative is ambiguous.
(c) Finally, it can also be shown that regardless of the value of β the total amount of jobs
created in the interior wage bargaining equilibrium is always ineﬃciently low.
Indeed, from the second equation in (37) it follows that
r
q(θ) (kf − ki)πρ = α(θ)(Sf − Si)+( ρSf − πSi) − r
q(θ)α(θ)(kfπ − kiρ).
Let us denote by θeff. the eﬃcient value of market tightness that satisﬁes this equation. Consider
now the two zero proﬁt conditions (18) and (19). By using (20) and some simple algebra we arrive
at
r
q(θ) (kf − ki)πρ =
(1−β)πρ
(α(θ)β((1−φ)π+φρ)+πρ) (α(θ)β (Sf − Si)+( ρSf − πSi)).
73Let us denote by θequil. the level of market tightness that satisﬁes the formula above in the
equilibrium with wage bargaining.
In region 2, Fig.6, i.e. where an interior equilibrium is possible, we have πkf <ρ k i. So, in that
region for any θ and φ it holds that:
α(θ)(Sf − Si)+( ρSf − πSi) − r
q(θ)α(θ)(kfπ − kiρ) >
(1−β)πρ
(α(θ)β((1−φ)π+φρ)+πρ) (α(θ)β (Sf − Si)+( ρSf − πSi)).










q2(θ) (kf − ki)πρ
´
> 0,
it is straightforward to see that θequil. <θ eff.. Thus, ﬁrms always underinvest in job creation
in the interior wage bargaining equilibrium. In other words, such a conclusion implies that given
kf >k i the derivative ∂H
∂θ |equil. a b o v em u s tb ep o s i t i v er e g a r d l e s so ft h ev a l u eo fβ. The implication
for the sign of ∂H
∂φ|equil., however, remains unclear.
Summary Four remarks below summarise the main implications that can be drawn from the
analysis of the two derivatives of the Hamiltonian ∂H
∂θ |equil. and ∂H
∂φ|equil. above.
First, two factors aﬀect the eﬃciency of equilibrium in our model. On the one hand, it is the
relation between the bargaining power of workers, β, and the elasticity of the matching function,
η(θ). On the other hand, it is the relation between the values of upfront costs, kf and ki. Both
relations aﬀect both the total amount of job creation in the economy and the allocation of jobs
between the two sectors.
Second, both ∂H
∂θ |equil. and ∂H
∂φ|equil. are equal to zero if and only if β = η(θ) and kf = ki. Hence,
this is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the eﬃciency of equilibrium.
Third, it is easy to see that condition β<η(θ) implies that ﬁrms tend to overinvest in creation of
informal jobs and the economy as a whole. Indeed, assuming, for example, that kf = ki, inequality
β<η(θ) implies that ∂H
∂φ|equil. > 0 and ∂H
∂θ |equil. < 0. By contrast, under condition β>η(θ) ﬁrms
ceteris paribus tend to underinvest in creation of informal jobs and in the economy as a whole.
Finally, condition kf >k i implies that ﬁrms tend to underinvest in creation of jobs both in
the formal sector and the economy as a whole (it is easy to see by putting β = η(θ)). Moreover,
whatever the relation between β and η(θ) ﬁrms always underinvest in job creation in our economy,
as proved in subsection (c) above.
A.3.3 Changes in parameters: the impact on job allocation
This section of the appendix provides an insight into how changes in potential policy instruments
(such as the tax rate τ,t h eﬁne rate F, eﬃciency of monitoring m, and unemployment compen-
sation bu)a ﬀect the allocation of jobs, the level of employment and unemployment in the interior
74equilibrium (Fig.4). We consider eﬀects of such changes for each policy parameter in turn, while
holding other parameters of the model constant.
Monitoring and ﬁnes for engagement in informal activity Monitoring of ﬁrms and ﬁnes for
engagement in the informal business are the costs of operating in the informal sector. Suppose, ﬁrst,
the government decides to subsidise monitoring authorities (e.g. the tax police) more generously,
which results in an increase in m - the variable, describing the probability that an employer gets
caught working in underground business. Such a rise in m leads, ﬁrstly, to a decrease in the informal
surplus relative to the formal surplus, and, secondly, to an increase in the rate of death of informal
matches. The former eﬀect has a negative impact on the proﬁtability of underground jobs, whereas
the latter has a positive externality eﬀect: since underground ﬁrms die faster, it becomes easier to
ﬁll in vacancies both for remaining formal and informal businesses.






, while the locus of informal jobs (19) moves downwards. This brings about an
increase in the share of formal vacancies, φ, as well as reduces the equilibrium value of the market
tightness, θ. Apart from that, it can also be shown that not only the proportion of formal vacancies
increases, but the total number of formal jobs also rises, while the total number of informal jobs
decreases. Moreover, the latter eﬀect is outweighed by the former so that unemployment decreases.
Instead of investing more in monitoring authorities, in an attempt to shackle the shadow sector
the government may simply increase punishment for involvement in underground business. In our
model, this would imply a rise in F.T h e e ﬀect of higher F is somewhat similar to that of an
increase in m, with the exception that the former does not aﬀect the eﬀective discount rate in the
informal sector, ρ, and, thus, does not create a positive externality on both formal and informal
ﬁrms competing for workers. Geometrically, an increase in F has absolutely the same eﬀect on
both loci (18) and (19) as a rise in m, so that the upshot of this policy is identical to that in the
previous paragraph: θ unambiguously decreases, while φ rises (Fig.8). The number of formal jobs
increases, while the number of informal jobs drops. Unemployment is also reduced.
Taxes Empirical literature has suggested that taxes levied in the formal sector are one of the
main possible reasons that drives potential employers underground as they represent one of the
costs of legal production (see, e.g., Johnson et al., 2000). In our model an increase in the value of
lump sum taxes on formal employers, τ,reduces the formal sector surplus and results in a downward
shift of the locus of formal jobs (18) in the (θ,φ)-plane, while the locus of informal jobs (19) turns
anti-clockwise around the point (θi,0). This implies that the equilibrium value of θ rises, whereas
the equilibrium value of φ decreases (Fig.7). The number of formal jobs decreases, and the number
of informal jobs rises, together with the number of unemployed. Thus, the eﬀect of a rise in taxes
is just opposite to the eﬀect of an increase in punishment rate F or monitoring intensity m.
75Unemployment beneﬁts Contrary to taxes, ﬁnes and monitoring, the eﬀect of unemployment
beneﬁts on both formal surplus Sf and informal surplus Si is symmetric: both are reduced to the
same degree if unemployment compensation is made more generous. An increase in bu makes both
loci (18) and (19) shift down. In the case of an interior equilibrium it is straightforward to verify
that
dφ
dbu < 0, while dθ
dbu =0by totally diﬀerentiating (18) and (19) with respect to θ, φ and bu,




result implies that in eﬀect for a given θ both loci shift by the same distance, i.e. the equilibrium
proportion of formal jobs, φ, decreases, whereas the equilibrium value of market tightness, θ, does
not change. Thus, in the mixed case the introduction of more generous unemployment beneﬁts
leads to crowding out of formal vacancies by informal ones. It will also decrease the number of
formal jobs, whereas both the number of informal jobs and unemployment will rise.
Other institutional changes Apart from parameters representing primary policy instruments,
the allocation of jobs across the sectors in the model depends on the value of entry costs, kf and
ki. These parameters reﬂect an institutional climate or environment in the economy: spreading
corruption and bribery, for instance, increases kf in relation to ki.
Consider, for example, a decrease in kf, which corresponds to less bribing and extortion in
the formal sector. This can possibly be achieved by restructuring bureaucracy and by better
enforcement of laws cracking down on corruption. With such a decrease in kf the locus of formal
jobs moves up, while the locus of informal jobs turns clockwise around the point (θi,0).T h e
outcome is a drop in the equilibrium value of θ, and an increase in the equilibrium value of φ.T h e
number of formal jobs also rises, whereas the number of informal jobs decreases along with the level
of unemployment. By contrast, an upsurge in corruption and rent-seeking in the economy would
result in an increase in kf, scare ﬁrms away from the formal sector, and increase unemployment.
This would also support informal production and shift the allocation of vacancies and jobs towards
informality (Fig.7).
Table 1 in the main text summarises the eﬀects of all changes considered here.
Some further notes on policies In order not to move the focus of discussion away from the
welfare eﬀect of various policies, summarised in table 1 in the main text, we use this section of the
appendix to look more closely at two particular implications that could be drawn from analysing
the table. The ﬁrst is concerned with the eﬀect of various policies on the size of the informal sector.
The second is related to the impact on unemployment. Let us consider them in turn.
The table suggests that a decrease in m, F, and/or a increase in τ, kf, and bu raise the share
of the informal sector in the economy measured both by the proportion of informal vacancies in
the total number of vacancies, (1 − φ), and by the ratio of ﬁlled informal jobs to ﬁlled formal jobs,
i.e. I/N.T h e e ﬀects of a change in the intensity of monitoring, the severity of punishment for
concealing business underground, as well as the eﬀect of higher taxes and impact of corruption
76in general concur well with results obtained in many other empirical and theoretical studies of
informal economies, which, however, often lacked a proper account of the labour market (for just a
few examples the reader can be referred to the studies by Murphy et al., 1993; Shleifer and Vishny,
1998; Friedman et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 2000; Sarte, 2000). It is interesting, however, that our
model suggests that an increase in the size of the informal sector may be a result of policies aimed
at making unemployment compensation more generous. Such an outcome can be contrasted to two
recent theoretical results by Boeri (2000) and Fugazza and Jacques (2004) as regards the eﬀect of
unemployment beneﬁts on the size of the informal economy.
Boeri (2000) has observed that overly generous non-employment beneﬁts at the outset of tran-
sition from planned to market economy in some countries of Eastern Europe favoured a labour
drive to non-employment, which in his model eﬀectively implies employment in the informal sector.
He explained that by the eﬀect that open-ended unemployment beneﬁts have on the decision of
the non-employed to actively search for jobs in the formal part of the economy. Higher beneﬁts
imply that more non-employed workers would prefer to receive the compensation and on top of
that enjoy readily available work in the subsistence sector. In other words, higher beneﬁts weaken
worker incentives to search for jobs in the formal sector.
A qualitatively diﬀerent result has been obtained by Fugazza and Jacques (2004) in the dual
labour market model where workers have to direct their search towards formal or informal vacancies.
In their work higher unemployment beneﬁts raise the worker’s value of being attached to the regular
sector, so that more individuals are likely to search for a job in the formal economy. The contrast
with the Boeri’s conclusion arises because of the assumption that unemployed workers searching
for jobs in the irregular sector do not receive unemployment compensation.
The crucial diﬀerence between our work and the two studies just mentioned is that there a
change in the value of beneﬁts does not aﬀect the decision of employers to take oﬀ in the informal
economy. In our model an increase in that value aﬀects the relative size of surpluses in each sector
and strengthens the bargaining position of job-seekers vis-à-vis employers. In the stable interior
equilibrium the surplus of a match is smaller in the formal sector, so the relative losses that ﬁrms
have to bear during wage bargains in the wake of the increase are higher in the formal part of the
economy. Hence, this urges more ﬁrms into the shadow sector.
The second point that can be seen from table 1 is that policies leading to an increase in informal
employment also cause an increase in unemployment. The existence of links between unemploy-
ment and underground employment is well-known. In many developing and transitional countries
informal activities have been argued to be of a subsistence nature (Gërxhani, 2004). They often
involve the individuals who are aﬀected most severely by changes in the economy and who cannot
ﬁnd a decent option in the formal sector. Not surprisingly, the unemployed, as a most vulnerable
cohort in the labour market, are, thus, the primary candidates for supplying labour in the infor-
mal sector. Theoretically it has already been suggested (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2001) that policies
77aimed at reducing unemployment pay oﬀ by scaling down the shadow sector. At the same time, a
conclusion has been made (ibid) that attempts to reduce, in the ﬁrst place, shadow employment
will result in higher open unemployment. Our model highlights that it is not always necessarily
true. Indeed, if one takes into account that labour turnover is higher in the shadow sector (as in
this essay is reﬂected in a shorter duration of an informal match), then crowding out of formal
vacancies by informal ones inevitably leads to a higher steady state unemployment. If, however,
the share of formal jobs in the economy increases, their on average longer duration makes for a
decrease in open unemployment. This is a general intuition for the results presented in table 1. By
contrast Boeri’s and Garibaldi’s (2001) argument is related to a speciﬁc view of the informal sector.
In particular, in their economy all jobs are necessarily formal when they are created. Informal
jobs are seen as a means not to sack a worker when some shock hits a formal production unit:
under certain conditions ﬁrms may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to convert formal, highly productive jobs into
informal, low-productive ones, and maintain them thereafter instead of closing down their business
completely. Meanwhile, workers employed in informal jobs have to look for better paid formal jobs
and compete in their search with the unemployed. In that case cracking down on the shadow sector
leads to an increase in open unemployment. At the same time, policies reducing unemployment
imply that it becomes easier for informally employed workers to ﬁnd a formal job, as competition
from the unemployed, also looking for formal jobs, subsides. As a result, the duration of shadow
jobs drops and the size of the shadow sector is reduced.
In the absence of on-the-job search in our framework we draw attention speciﬁcally to the
moment of entry into the economy, and suggest that it is important to create conditions attracting
more ﬁrms into the formal sector, which will pay oﬀ by decreasing steady state unemployment.
A.3.4 Level curves for surpluses and state revenue
In the main text we consider the level curves of private surplus (26) and government revenue (35)
in the (θ,φ)-plane. Here we highlight the factors that their slopes depend upon.


















78This derivative is unambiguously positive if α0 (θ) ≥ (1 − β)q(θ) or, for that matter, β ≥ η(θ).









In the interior equilibrium it is always positive and equal to
∂Ξ(θ,φ)
∂φ |equil. = θ
r(δ+m)δ(mrki+(kf−ki)(α(θ)βφm+(δ+m+α(θ))(r+βδ)))
(δ(δ+m)+α(θ)(δ+φm))2(1−β) > 0.
Thus, by using the implicit function theorem, the slope of the level curve of the private surplus






From the expression above it can be seen that the higher is kf as compared to ki, and the lower
is β as compared to the elasticity of the matching function, η(θ), the steeper is the level curve in
the (θ,φ)-plane at the point of the interior equilibrium (see Fig.9).
State revenue The government revenue is given in (35). Its partial derivative with respect to θ




(δ(δ+m)+α(θ)(δ+φm))2 (φ(δ + m)τ +( 1− φ)δmF +( δ + φm)bu) > 0.




(δ(δ+m)+α(θ)(δ+φm))2 ((δ + m + α(θ))τ − (δ + α(θ))mF + mbu) > 0.
It is unambiguously positive in the interior equilibrium as τ>m F .
Then the slope of the government revenue level curve in the (θ,φ)-plane is
∂θ
∂φ|R; equil. = −
α(θ)((δ+m+α(θ))τ−(δ+α(θ))mF+mbu)
α0(θ)(φ(δ+m)τ+(1−φ)δmF+(δ+φm)bu) < 0.
Thus, the bigger is τ as compared to mF the steeper is the level curve.
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